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ABSTRACT 
CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF ENTERPRISE RISKS: 
A DELPHI FEASIBILITY STUDY 
by 
Robert Baksa 
A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve 
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for ongoing 
assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately mitigated.  Enterprises 
are perpetually exposed to fraud, poor decision making and/or other inefficiencies that 
can lead to significant financial loss and/or increased levels of operating risk. 
Increasingly, Information Systems are being harnessed to reinvent the risk management 
process.  One promising technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to transform the 
audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous review of all 
transactions.  However, the highly integrated, rapidly changing and hypercompetitive 
business environment of many corporations spawns numerous Enterprise Risks that have 
been excluded from standard risk management processes.  An extension of Continuous 
Auditing is Continuous Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review 
business processes for unexpected deviations.  Using a Delphi, the feasibility and 
desirability of applying Continuous Monitoring to different Enterprise Risks is studied. 
This study uncovers a significant relationship between the perceived business value of 
Continuous Monitoring and years of experience in Risk Management and Auditing, 
determines that all key architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring system are 
known, and indicates that Continuous Monitoring may be better suited for monitoring 
computer crime than monitoring strategic risks such as the loss of a competitive position. 
CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF ENTERPRISE RISKS: 
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A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve 
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for timely and 
ongoing assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately identified and 
mitigated.  These needs are paramount especially in large multinational corporations with 
highly distributed operations, extremely complex operating environments, and massive 
volumes of data, transactions, risks and controls that require review.  Organizations are 
continually exposed to significant errors, fraud and/or inefficiencies that can lead to 
significant financial loss and increased levels of operating risk.  The larger and more 
complex the organization, the greater these Enterprise Risks are (Coderre 2005). 
An unmitigated Enterprise Risk can quickly grow into a full blown and far-
reaching financial crisis, which is a long-standing and pervasive problem for capital 
markets and society as a whole.  Reinhart and Rogoff chronicled financial crises over 
eight millennia that occurred in 66 distinct countries (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011).  
Moreover, business complexity has increased six-fold in sixty years; and, organizational 
complexity in terms of structures, processes and systems has increased by a factor of 
thirty-five (Morieux and Tollman 2014).  During the same period, some have suggested 
that risk management has not evolved as quickly.  The limited complexity and 
information richness currently used by internal auditors is woefully inadequate to model 




Unfortunately, these antiquated risk management procedures afford only a limited 
evaluation of an organization’s business processes and Enterprise Risks.  In today's 
hyper-complex and highly integrated operating environments, these risk management 
techniques are becoming increasingly inadequate as a preventative measure for a 
financial crisis.   
Increasingly, technology is being harnessed to reinvent and improve risk 
management processes.  Recent advances in Information Systems, artificial intelligence 
and modeling techniques have enabled sophisticated risk analysis.  One particularly 
promising application of this technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to 
transform the audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous 
review of all transactions.  However, today’s highly integrated, rapidly changing and 
hypercompetitive business environment spawns numerous Enterprise Risks that 
historically have been excluded from typical internal risk management processes (e.g., 
surprise competitive threats, theft of sensitive customer data and supply chain failures).  
These high-value risks pose a material threat to today’s corporations, which perhaps 
exceed the danger posed by fine-grain transactional risks that Continuous Auditing is 
predominately being used for at this time. 
An extension of Continuous Auditing is referred to in this study as Continuous 
Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review business processes for 
unexpected deviations.  Continuous Monitoring, like Continuous Auditing, requires a 
comprehensive understanding of an organization’s business processes as well as their 
potential failure modes, key control points, rules, metrics and exceptions.  When the 




assessments in real time, analyze business processes for anomalies and utilize data-driven 
indicators to identify emerging risks, which should help management make informed 
decisions, mitigate material risks and, hopefully, help prevent the next financial crisis.  
This research study will seek to understand which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to 
Continuous Monitoring techniques. 
1.2 Research Problem 
Whether or not Continuous Monitoring can be effectively used by management to 
monitor Enterprise Risks remains an open research question.  Some believe that there are 
sizable benefits to extending the use of Continuous Monitoring applications.  For 
example, one of the Office of Financial Research’s key 2014 research objectives is to 
identify, assess and monitor potential threats to the United States’ financial stability by 
developing tools that will monitor quantitative metrics and qualitative surveillance 
(Berner 2013).  However, there are numerous obstacles:  1) replacing human judgment 
tends to be difficult, costly and computationally intensive; 2) large-scale Continuous 
Monitoring systems could be resisted because of their inscrutable complexity and 
novelty; 3) people and organizations may fear Continuous Monitoring because it erodes 
their competitive advantage and powerbase.   
To determine whether this is a viable approach, I will explore the research 
question: What are the most potentially fruitful Enterprise Risks and a plausible technical 
architecture to support these implementations? 
By using a Delphi, I will seek to drive expert consensus on the desirability and 
feasibility for applying Continuous Monitoring techniques to Enterprise Risks.  The 




implementations that drastically improves an organization’s risk management processes 




Figure  1.1 Blends three distinct disciplines. 
1.3 Significance of this Research 
Currently, the conditions that could lead to another major corporate catastrophe may not 
be fully known or understood at the appropriate level within a corporation, until it is too 
late to take meaningful action.  This is due to the complex and integrated dependencies 
between corporations and the sheer number of potential Enterprise Risks they face.  
Continuous Monitoring’s key objectives are to quickly detect a risk, assess its potential 
magnitude, and route it to the appropriate party for remediation, thereby reducing the 
probability of a corporate catastrophe.   
Continuous Monitoring has the potential to improve an organization’s Enterprise 
Risk Management processes, thereby reducing the probability of crisis resulting from an 




in this regard; if it is widely adopted and trusted by management throughout the 
enterprise. 
With the ultimate goal of preventing the next crisis, this research study seeks to 
identify the Enterprise Risks that are most amenable to Continuous Monitoring, provide 
an architectural framework for future Continuous Monitoring implementations, and, most 
likely, identify future research opportunities within the domain of Continuous 
Monitoring.  To that end, the following four research questions were studied: 
• RQ1: What individual and organizational characteristics are related to the 
likelihood of favorable opinions toward the adoption of Continuous 
Monitoring?  
• RQ2: Which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to Continuous 
Monitoring?  
• RQ3: Which Continuous Monitoring architectural components are 
perceived as most applicable to which types of Enterprise Risks? 
• RQ4: How does participation in an online Delphi process change the 
initial viewpoints of the participants? 
 
The research methodology was a three-round Collaborative Design Delphi 
targeting professionals with experience in risk management, accounting and/or 
Information Systems.  The Round 1 questionnaire had a consent form, demographic 
questions and scenario generation questions.  Round 2 presented the three most 
auspicious risk scenarios from Round 1 and had participants evaluate the desirability and 
feasibility of using Continuous Monitoring on these risk scenarios.  Round 3 presented 
the key assumptions collected in Round 2 and let the participants re-evaluate their 




1.4 Organizational Structure 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief literature 
review for Enterprise Risk Management.  Chapter 3 is a literature review for Continuous 
Auditing and Monitoring.  Chapter 4 surveys the enabling Information System 
technologies for Continuous Auditing and Monitoring systems.  Chapter 5 lays out a 
research agenda and methods.  Chapter 6 presents the results of this Research Study.  
Chapter 7 summarizes this research study’s findings and lists some research questions 






ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Definition 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a top-down risk-based approach to strategically 
manage a broad spectrum of corporate risks at the enterprise level.  ERM is conceptually 
similar to corporate risk management, business risk management, holistic risk 
management, integrated risk management and strategic risk management, although each 
of these terms has a slightly different nuance (D'Arcy 2001). 
Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) defines ERM as “a discipline by which an 
organization in any industry assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks 
from all sources for the purposes of increasing the organization’s short- and long-term 
value to its stakeholders.”  This definition highlights ERM’s value creation as well as risk 
mitigation aspects.  The corporation defines a top down process that methodically 
evaluates all plausible risks and considers their effect on all the relative stakeholders 
(CAS 2003, p. 8). 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organization (COSO) of the Treadway 
Commission’s ERM definition is “a process, affected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, applied in strategy-setting and across the enterprise, 
designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be 
within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
entity objectives.”  This definition highlights ongoing and strategic process flowing 




designed to identify events that, if they occur, could materially affect the organization, 
achieve one or more separate but overlapping objectives, and provide reasonable 
assurance to the corporation’s management (COSO 2004, p. 2). 
(Makomaski 2008) simply and succinctly defines Enterprise Risk Management as 
a decision-making discipline that addresses variation in company goals.  Alviniussen and 
Jankensgård define ERM as a holistic and company-wide approach (i.e., not a silo-
approach) to managing risks and centralizing information in a Risk Universe 
(Alviniussen and Jankensgård 2009).  They draw insights from modern portfolio theory 
that suggests that risks should be measured and managed on a portfolio basis and 
balanced against potential rewards, as well as from financial theorists that point out 
financial distress generally entails costly consequences.  Consequently, an effective risk 
management program derives tangible business value by avoiding the costs associated 
with financial distress. 
2.2 History 
In 1654, the precursors to modern risk management were established when Pascal and 
Fermat discovered the basics of probability.  By 1725, mathematicians were devising 
tables of life expectancy and marine insurance emerged as a legitimate business in 
England.  In 1730, Abraham de Moivre discovered two essential ingredients for 
quantifying risk: standard deviation and normal distribution.  In 1875, Francis Glaton 
discovered regression to the mean.  In 1952, Harry Markowitz pioneered  modern 
portfolio theory (Bernstein 1996).   
In the 1950s, the risk management field was formalized by a group of insurance 




Enterprise.  The basic premise was to maximize the productive efficiency of the 
corporation by managing risks in a comprehensive manner, and not simply insure them 
(Mehr and Hedge 1963).  
In the 1970s, financial risk (e.g., foreign exchange risk, commodity price risk and 
equity risk) became an important source of organizational risk.  Therefore, tools were 
developed for handling them (e.g., foreign currency futures, commodity futures contracts, 
and equity options).  These tools usage accelerated during the next two decades and their 
misuse led to some exorbitant losses: Orange County ($1.5 Billion), Barings Bank ($500 
Million), and Procter & Gamble ($157 Million) (Razali and Tahir 2011).  In the 1990s, 
operational risk management emerged when shareholders began pressuring corporations 
to proactively mitigate risks rather than simply buying insurance for them.  In the wake of 
various major corporate scandals and bankruptcies resulting from poor risk management, 
the United States government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation in 2002, which 
mandates a top down risk assessment.  Shortly thereafter, ERM was defined by CAS 
(Dionne 2013). 
2.3 Process 
At a high-level, there are two main potential Enterprise Risk Management processes 
described in the literature: CAS and COCO.  CAS defines the high-level ERM process as 
follows: establish context, identify risks, analyze/quantify risks, assess/prioritize risks, 
treat/exploit risks, and monitor and review the process (CAS 2003).  There are eight 
components of the COSO Integrated Framework:  
1. Internal environment which refers to risk management philosophy, risk 





2. Objective setting which should be aligned with corporate vision and risk 
appetite 
3. Event identification 
4. Risk assessment that measures the frequency and impact of potential 
losses 
5. Risk response is how a corporation mitigates risks. It may include 
avoidance, acceptance, and transfer of risk to and external entity 
6. Control activities ensure the effectiveness of the risk management 
implementation 
7. Information and communication disseminates program information 
throughout the corporations  
8. Monitoring ensures that all risk management measures are appropriate and 
effective in mitigating risks (COSO 2004). 
 
2.4 Benefits of Enterprise Risk Management 
ERM should promote top-down risk awareness, which facilitates better operational and 
strategic decision-making.  Some believe that ERM will become the new minimum 
standard for risk management, the key to survival for many companies and a significant 
source of competitive advantage (Stroh 2005).  The following summarizes the key 
benefits described in the literature. 
• (Berinato 2004) asserts that corporations that adopt ERM have fewer 
failed business ventures and incur less costs due to adverse events. (Heng 
Yik, Jifeng et al. 2011) showed that insurers with the best ERM programs 
had lower stock volatility and higher profitability as compared to those of 
their non-ERM or weak ERM peers. 
• (COSO 2004) states that the benefits of its framework are improved 
capital deployment, tighten alignment between strategy and risk, increased 
opportunity to seize opportunities and reduced operational surprises. 
• (Cumming and Hirtle 2001) state that ERM enables corporations to 
allocate capital efficiently among their business units and improves 
financial disclosures by providing a consistent and comprehensive 




• (Hoyt and Liebenbergerg 2008) found a positive relationship between 
United States Insurers’ market value and the use of ERM.  The ERM 
premium was roughly 20%, which is both statistically and economically 
significant.   
• (KPMG 2011) states that corporations that have ERM processes tend to 
better understand their business risk profile and are often more proactive 
in heading off threats, and, rapidly surfacing and evaluating opportunities.   
• (Lindberg and Seifert 2011) explains how ERM can aid with Dodd-Frank 
compliance. 
• (Nocco 2006) speculates that ERM creates shareholder values by 
improving the mechanism to quantify and manage a corporation’s risk-
return tradeoff  
• (Meulbroek 2002) determines that ERM increases corporate valuations, 




There are many reasons a corporation may adopt ERM.  Paape and Speklé found a 
corporation’s regulatory environment, internal factors, ownership structure, and, firm and 
industry-related characteristics influence the choice to adopt ERM (Paape and Speklé 
2012).  For non-financial corporations (Alviniussen and Jankensgård 2009) determine the 
main motivations for implementing ERM (listed in order from the most cited to least) are 
improving corporate governance, improving compliance, mandate by board of directors, 
increasing shareholder value, improving decision marking, and following good business 
practices.  Once a corporation decides to implement ERM they should adopt a Risk 





2.5.1 Risk Taxonomy 
There are numerous types of risks that can be incorporated into an ERM.  However, the 
list below describes the risk taxonomy that is most frequently associated with ERM 
literature: 
• Compliance Risk: Risk of violations or non-conformance with laws, rules, 
regulations, prescribed practices or ethical standards (OCC 1998). 
• Financial Risk: Risk of loss due to economic conditions.  For example, 
Credit Risk is the risk of an obligor's failure to meet the terms of a 
contract; Foreign Exchange Risk is the risk arising from movement in 
foreign exchange rates; Liquidity Risk is the inability to meet obligations 
when they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses; Price Risk is 
the adverse changes in the value of portfolios of financial instruments 
(OCC 1998).  
• Strategic Risk: “Risk to earnings or capital arising from adverse business 
decisions or improper implementation of them. This risk is a function of 
the compatibility between an organization’s strategic goals, the business 
strategies developed to achieve those goals, the resources deployed against 
them, and the quality of the implementation of those decisions” (OCC 
1998, p. 5).   
• Operational Risk: Risk of inadequate or failed internal or external  
processes, people and systems (Basel 2001) 
 
2.5.2 ERM Frameworks 
There are a number of ERM frameworks that are currently being used.  The most 
frequently cited are: 
• A Risk Management Standard by the Federation of European Risk 
Management (FERMA). 
• Australia/New Zealand Standard 4360-Risk Management. 
• Basel. 
• COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management-Integrated Framework. 
• King ll Report by The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA). 





• The Institute of Management Accountants’ (IMA) “A Global Perspective 
on Assessing Internal Control over Financing Reporting” (ICoFR). 
 
Although these standards may differ in name, industry and region, they all identify, 
prioritize and quantify risks in order to help corporations effectively manage their 
exposure (Yazid, Hussin et al. 2011) 
2.5.3 Best Practices 
The literature describes several best practices that have been adopted by successful ERM 
implementations. (Lawrence 2005) describe ten best practices for an ERM 
implementation: 
1. Engage senior management and board. 
2. Create an independent ERM entity under the Chief Risk Officer. 
3. Impose a top-down governance structure. 
4. Select an ERM framework suitable for the corporation’s key risk. 
5. Establish a risk aware culture. 
6. Disseminate written policies with risk limits and business boundaries. 
7. Create an ERM dashboard that integrates key quantitative and qualitative 
risk metrics. 
8. Use risk analytics to measure risk concentrations and interdependencies. 
9. Integrate ERM into strategic planning, business processes and 
performance measurement. 






(Barton, Shenkir et al. 2009) suggest the following seven best practices: 
1. Integrate the ERM process into the corporation’s strategy. 
2. Understand the corporation’s risk appetite. 
3. Understand the corporation’s major risks. 
4. Ensure corporate governance is strong. 
5. Develop meaningful risk metrics. 
6. Link compensation to risk. 
7. Do not dismiss high impact low probability risks. 
 
2.6 Challenges 
ERM has not been universally adopted.  Beasley and Clune survived senior accounting 
executives, which revealed only 20% currently had an ERM in their corporation and 29% 
had no plans to implement one (Beasley, Clune et al. 2005).  Negus highlights ten 
common ERM implementation challenges: Assessing ERM’s value, balancing risk 
visibility with legal exposure, defining risk, selecting a risk assessment method, 
assessment metrics and time horizon, understanding a risk’s multiple event likelihoods 
and severities, ERM ownership (i.e., determining what internal group champions the 
ERM effort), risk reporting (i.e., determining what information should be shared with 
whom), simulations and stress tests (i.e., balancing the needs for meaningful simulation 
with the near infinite number of potential scenarios) (Negus 2010). 
In September 2008, (Beasley, Branson et al. 2009) surveyed more than 700 
corporations, whose revenue ranged from $15 thousand to $115 Billion.  The main 
barriers to ERM implementation were competing priorities, insufficient resources, lack of 
perceived value, lack of executive leadership, incremental bureaucracy, and legal or 






CONTINUOUS AUDITING AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING 
3.1 Definitions 
Global Technology Audit Guide (GTAG) defines Continuous Auditing as a process to 
ensure that the policies, procedures, and business processes are operating effectively, 
which includes defining the control objectives and assurance assertions and establishing 
automated tests to highlight activities and transactions that fail to comply.  They also 
define several related processes: 
• Continuous Control Assessment: a process that focuses on the early 
detection of control deficiencies. 
• Continuous Risk Assessment: a process that detects processes or systems 
that experience higher than expected levels of risk (Coderre 2005).  
• Continuous Monitoring: a process to ensure that the policies, procedures, 
and business processes are operating effectively, which includes defining 
the control objectives and assurance assertions and establishing automated 
tests to highlight activities and transactions that fail to comply. 
 
Deloitte’s definition of Continuous Auditing and Continuous Monitoring adds the nuance 
that Continuous Auditing is used by internal audit to continually gather data that supports 
their auditing activities while Continuous Monitoring is used by management to 
continually review business processes for unexpected deviations (2010). Continuous 
Monitoring, per the above Deloitte definition, is related to Continuous Auditing.   
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) define Continuous Auditing as “a 
methodology that enables independent auditors to provide written assurance on the 




time after the occurrence of the events that underline the subject matter” (CICA/AICPA 
1999, p. xiii)  Rezaee defines Continuous Auditing as “a systematic process of gathering 
electronic evidence as a reasonable basis to render an opinion on fair presentation of 
financial statements prepared under the paperless, real-time accounting system” (Rezaee 
2001, p. 151).  Helms and Mancino define Continuous Auditing as “software to detect 
auditors specific exceptions from all transactions that are processed either in real-time or 
near real-time environments.  These exceptions could be investigated immediately or 
written to an auditor’s log for subsequent work” (Helms, Mancino et al. 1999, p. 62).  
Although the above definitions differ in semantics and scope, they all share the notion of 
performing auditing processes quickly and continuously.   
3.2 History 
Accounting practices have been around for a very long time.  In the Mesopotamia, circa 
3500 BC, scribes, the forerunners of modern day accountants, would record the terms of 
financial transactions on tamper-resistant clay tablets (Alexander 2002).  In the United 
States, contemporary accounting practices emerged in the 19th century when accounting 
professionals applied quantitative methods to assess the amount, timing and certainty of a 
corporation's future cash flows (King 2006).  Over time, these accounting practices have 
amassed a comparatively cheap and plentiful workforce, ingrained themselves into 
contemporary business processes, and proven generally reliable, flexible and independent 
from underlying information technology (Weber).  Perhaps motivated by their own self-
interest, several influential accounting professionals are highly skeptical that these 




Cash is generally credited with the seminal article that laid the foundation for the 
Continuous Auditing domain space.  Cash and Bailey describe various procedures to 
validate the correctness of Electronic Data Processing (EDP) systems and The Internal 
Control Model (TICOM) (Cash Jr, Bailey Jr et al. 1977).  This model enables the 
automation of testing an organization’s internal control system.  He envisioned that the 
organization’s internal control would be stored in a database.  Vasarhelyi and Halper 
coined the term Continuous Auditing when they described the process used at AT&T 
Bell Labs to audit a large paperless billing system in real-time (Vasarhelyi and Halper 
1991).  This paper describes the key building blocks of a Continuous Auditing system: 
extracting audit data from a system, using it to calculate operational analytics that are 
compared to standard metrics, generating alarms that alert an auditor to potential issues 
and generating audit reports. 
3.3 Process 
The Continuous Auditing literature describes many different processes.  Chan and 
Vasarhelyi defines a basic Continuous Auditing process, which is a four-stage process.  
Stage 1 automates data capture.  Stage 2 uses data modeling of historic transactions and 
account balances to create benchmarks.  Stage 3 uses these benchmarks to evaluate 
internal controls, transactions and account balances.  Stage 4 investigates only the 
benchmark exceptions.  If no exceptions are discovered, the financial information is 








Figure 3.1 Basic continuous auditing process. 
 
(Coderre 2006) puts forward a five-step process to continuously analyze audit data:  
1. Define Objectives, which includes identifying key Information Systems 
and data sources, and understanding the business processes and 
application systems in place.   
2. Determine Data Access and Use, which includes selecting analysis tools, 
developing analysis capabilities, auditor analysis skills and techniques, 
and assessing integrity and reliability of the data.   
3. Perform a Continuous Control Assessment, which includes identifying 
critical control points, defining control rules, defining exceptions, and 
designing an approach to test controls and identify deficiencies.  
4. Perform a Continuous Risk Assessment, which includes defining entities 
to be evaluated, identifying risk categories and identifying data-driven 
indicators. 
5. Report and Manage Results, which includes prioritizing results, 
identifying control deficiencies or increased levels of risk, initiating 
appropriate audit response, providing results to management, evaluating 
the results of the actions taken, and monitoring and evaluating the 
effectiveness and security over the whole process. 
 
(Fedorowicz 2008) has a five-step process:  
1. Identify the full range of risks. 
2. Establish a risk management culture. 
3. Align controls with risks embedded in the business processes. 
4. Devise procedures for manual interventions. 


















(Rezaee 2002) suggests a ten-step process:  
1. Define audit objectives. 
2. Understand business rules. 
3. Identify key business data. 
4. Obtain data. 
5. Identify data elements. 
6. Establish data access. 
7. Extract data. 
8. Create Audit Meta-data. 
9. Load Audit Data. 
10. Execute Audit Test Scripts. 
 
3.4 Benefits 
Several different studies and research reports have listed a wide array of potential 
benefits from a well-functioning Continuous Auditing system.  A Deloitte report (2010) 
lists the following benefits that could result from a Continuous Auditing system: 
improved risk and control assurance, reduced audit costs, increased audit effectiveness, 
reduced audit cycles, identifying control exceptions in real time by replacing manual 
preventative controls with automated detective controls, and increased competitive 
advantage and shareholder value.  A Gartner research report written by (Caldwell and 
Proctor 2010) states that the primary market drivers for Continuous Auditing are 
regulatory compliance, risk management and business performance.  In September 2008, 
the Economist asked 446 senior executives what their views were on the expected 
benefits from standardizing/automating their financial processes.  The list of expected 




on error prone manual processes, enhancing data integrity, allowing employees to focus 
on high value activities, reducing costs, institutionalizing standard processes across the 
enterprise, improving productivity, increasing process visibility, and enhancing 
compliance with regulatory requirements (Fedorowicz 2008).  In one specific example 
(Brennan 2008), who has implemented Continuous Auditing techniques at Siemens, lists 
the following benefits that his organization has received from Continuous Auditing: 
audits get deeper and broader, audits take less time, improve communication with 
external auditors and key controls are rationalized.  The following subsections explore 
some of the potential benefits of a Continuous Auditing in more detail. 
3.4.1 Reduced Costs 
Several cost savings are associated with Continuous Auditing, which automates the 
auditing of business processes.  First, Continuous Auditing continually and automatically 
monitors control effectiveness, which eliminates the labor-intensive and repetitive re-
testing of controls by obviating the need to re-perform most if not all point-in-time audits.  
Second, placing the requisite audit data in a central repository that can be remotely 
accessed obviates the need for traveling to remote locations to perform site audits.  Third, 
external auditor’s fees would be ideally eliminated or, at least, sharply reduced because 
the Continuous Auditing systems would automatically perform most, if not all, of the 
auditing and assurance processes.   
A study by (Wallace 1984) concluded that shifting audit responsibility to internal 
auditors and away from external auditors reduces the total auditing cost for an 
organization.  Reducing the cost of the audit and monitoring processes is especially 




stringent.  These cost savings can be quantified and compared to the cost of 
implementing a Continuous Auditing system.  However, other advantages of automation 
such as enhanced data integrity, fewer instances of noncompliance, better business 
decisions and risk management and reduced fraud risk are harder to quantify. 
3.4.2 Improved Audit Quality  
There are several ways that Continuous Auditing could improve audit quality.  Means 
and Warren point out the limitations of the traditional auditing model, which relies on the 
presence of internal controls and sampling (i.e., the periodic checks of selected controls) 
(Means and Warren 2005).  Much of the traditional audit process must be done manually 
in order to examine the effectiveness of a corporation’s internal controls.  However, 
Continuous Auditing advances make plausible a new and better audit approach that 
continuously checks all of an organization’s financials and related transactional data, and 
perpetually searches for audit anomalies or outright fraud.  Generally speaking, 
Continuous Auditing systems detect audit exceptions quickly and notify the appropriate 
parties so corrective action can also be taken quickly. 
Several studies illuminate the foibles of human decision making that detract from 
audit quality.  Since Continuous Auditing systems do not share these biases, these 
systems could presumably perform better and more objective audits.  Bazerman and  
Loewenstein suggest that auditors cannot be totally objective because of an innate self-
serving bias (Bazerman, Loewenstein et al. 2002).  They tend to discount facts 
contradicting their preferred position and uncritically embrace evidence supporting it.  He 
lists several reasons for this: ambiguity (auditors tend to reach for self-serving 




motivated to remain in a client's good graces), and approval (auditor may accept a more 
aggressive accounting position from clients than they themselves would recommend). 
Just like all human beings, auditors suffer from the foibles of human decision-
making.  Hammond and Keene states eight psychological traps that may lead to bad 
decision-making: 
1. The status quo trap: biases towards maintaining the current situation even 
when better alternatives exist. 
2. The sunk cost trap: the tendency to justify past decisions. 
3. The evidence trap: the tendency to search for information supporting an 
existing predilection and to discount opposing information. 
4. The framing trap: undermining the entire decision-making process by 
misstating the problem. 
5. The overconfidence trap: overestimating the accuracy of our forecasts. 
6. The prudence trap: tendency to be overcautious when estimating uncertain 
events. 
7. The recallability trap: the tendency to give undue weight to recent and 
dramatic events. 
8. The anchoring trap: the tendency to give disproportionate weight to the 
first information received (Hammond, Keeney et al. 2001). 
 
(Smith and Kida 1991) confirms that auditors do fall prey to the anchoring trap however, 
expert auditors performing familiar job-related tasks are less likely to fall into the 
anchoring trap than the control groups were. 
As an organization’s scale and scope of operations increases so does the 
complexity of its business transactions, risk exposure, and, scale and scope of their audit 
procedures.  Since manual audit procedures do not scale well, once an organization 
reaches a sufficient size these audit procedures become prohibitively expensive and time-




Consequently, it may be the only viable alternative for today's largest global 
organizations. 
3.4.3 Compliance with Laws and Regulations 
Public Organizations are forced to comply with many different laws and regulations 
however, the cost to comply with these laws and regulations is staggering.  For example, 
United States-based companies must comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 
2002, which was enacted in the wake of a number of major accounting scandals including 
the collapse of Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom.  A study conducted by Finance 
Executives International (FEI) indicated that for 185 companies with average revenues of 
$4.7 billion, the average compliance costs were $1.7 million (FEI 2008).  Section 404 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which requires management and the external auditor to 
report on the adequacy of a company's internal controls, is the most costly aspect of the 
legislation for companies to implement because documenting and testing important 
financial controls requires enormous effort (Mehra 2006).  Moreover, most organizations 
have additional compliance costs such as producing audited financial statements, which 
requires an independent auditor to attest to the accuracy and completeness of their 
financial statements. 
There is a clear trend toward increasing and constantly evolving regulatory 
requirements. For example, in the banking industry the Basel I accord, which was ratified 
in 1988, influenced banks residing in G-10 countries behavior by proscribing capital 
ratios (Jablecki 2009), which was replaced by Basel II in June 2004, and Basel III 
(Moody's 2012).  In July of 2010 when the Dodd-Frank legislation was signed into law, 
the banking industry received a whole new wave of regulations.  This act was billed as 
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the most sweeping overhaul of the United States financial regulatory system since the 
Great Depression (2009) and was responsible for roughly 300 new regulatory 
requirements affecting many different lines of business for financial institutions (Protess 
2011).  For example, it limits abusive lending practices, fees for debit-card usage and 
high-risk bets on complex derivative securities, creates a bureau to protect consumers 
from financial fraud, and provides a means for the government to supervise the largest 
financial institutions under the guise of avoiding catastrophic financial failure (2011).    
Clearly, these new compliance requirements will increase these organizations’ 
compliance expense.  For example, Basel II, which is an international standard that 
regulates how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against financial and 
operational risks, has three Pillars.  Pillar 1 quantifies the bank's credit risk (i.e., the risk 
of a loss due to a debtor's nonpayment of a loan or other line of credit) and operational 
risk (the risk of loss from a bank’s business functions including fraud risk and 
environmental risks) to calculate the capital requirements for international banks.  These 
capital requirements aim to ensure that international banks have sufficient capital to meet 
their requirements, cover unexpected losses and promote public confidence.  In general, 
the greater the bank’s risk, the greater its capital reserves must be.  Pillar 2 describes the 
requisite management obligations in evaluating the bank’s corporate governance, risk 
management and risk profiles that are not explicitly covered by Pillar 1.  Systemic risk 
(i.e., the risk of loss due to a collapse of the entire financial system or market), 
concentration risk (i.e., the risk of loss due to the concentration of a bank’s outstanding 
accounts relative to the total number of debtors that the bank has lent money to) and 
liquidity risk (i.e., the risk of loss resulting from being unable to trade a security or asset 
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quickly) are some of the residual risks that are addressed in Pillar 2.  Pillar 3 explains 
transparency and disclosure requirements.  Specifically, stakeholders should have 
sufficient understanding of the bank's activities and risks to make informed decisions 
about the bank's overall risk position (2006).  The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency estimates that if all nationally chartered banks were to adopt Basel II, the 
combined compliance costs would be nearly $1.1 billion, or almost $680,000 per bank 
(VanHoose 2007).   
There have been several journal articles that suggest Continuous Auditing could 
help organizations reduce their cost of compliance.  Means and Warren discusses how 
new software that continuously extracts data from enterprise systems can perform a broad 
range of auditing, fraud tests and anomaly identification (Means and Warren 2005).  
Vasarhelyi asserts that Continuous Auditing techniques may assist in Sarbanes-Oxley 
compliance by providing evidence that controls are functioning and furthermore provide 
an understanding of the consequences of ineffective or non-operational controls 
(Vasarhelyi 2004).  While this software may never totally replace manual auditing, many 
speculate that it could cost-effectively perform many traditional auditing tasks. 
3.4.4 Reduced Risk 
Companies that quickly make high-quality decisions and implement them effectively 
generally beat out rivals (Blenko and Mankins 2012).  Conversely, according to a Booz 
Allen report, the biggest threat to shareholder value over the past ten years was overly 
risky decisions made by senior management.  They cost more shareholder value than 
other audit issues such as fraud, ethics violations or rogue traders (Ovans 2012).  This 




firm’s biggest loss category was “Execution, Delivery and Process Management”, which 
accounted for 32% of their total loss or €4.8 billion in 2011.   Although the supporting 
research is sparse, Continuous Auditing seeks to drastically improve the organizational 
decision and risk management processes by augmenting and checking human decision-
making.  Therefore, it’s plausible that Continuous Auditing could improve organizational 
decision-making and reduce the number of associated loss events, thereby directly 
improving the organization’s bottom line. 
In 2008, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimated that United 
States organizations lost 7% of their annual revenues, approximately $994 billion, to 
fraudulent activity.  Even more troubling, internal and external audits and internal 
controls detect only 23.3% of all fraud.  Fraudulent financial statements had the highest 
median loss of all fraud schemes with a median loss of $2 million per incident (Ratley 
2008). 
Opinions vary on how effective Continuous Auditing would be in detecting 
fraudulent financial statements, which is generally perpetrated by executives of an 
organization.  Vasarhelyi, and Kogan asserts that a well performed Continuous Audit 
would have detected Enron's fraudulent accounting improprieties, because the continuous 
assurance process would have triggered alarms that would have been difficult for Enron's 
operational managers, auditors and top management to ignore (Vasarhelyi, Kogan et al. 
2002).  However, Krass argues that Continuous Auditing probably would not prevent 
fraud that is perpetrated at the highest levels of an organization, which was the case with 




There is a growing body of research that suggests Continuous Auditing could be a 
valuable tool in preventing some types of fraud schemes.  Lin used a fuzzy neural 
network to assess the risk of fraudulent financial reporting for an organization (Lin 2003).  
Using publicly available metrics such as allowance for doubtful accounts as a percentage 
of net sales and accounts receivable, ratio of gross margin to net sales, net sales, accounts 
receivable and allowance for doubtful accounts, this model was able to successfully 
detect fraud 35% of the time, which was better than the logistic regression model that 
only had a 5% detection rate.  Baker and McCollum explain how machine learning 
technologies such as inductive logic programming and neural nets are helping 
organizations such as Bank Itau and Sun Trust Bank detect suspicious activity and 
mitigate the risk of fraudulent transactions (Baker and McCollum 2005).  Viaene and 
Derrig investigate the explicative capabilities of three classification algorithms (neural 
nets, decision trees and logistical regression) in detecting fraudulent automobile claims 
that occurred in Massachusetts during 1993 (Viaene, Derrig et al. 2002). 
(Eining 1997) compared three decision aids (checklist, logistic regression and 
expert systems) on their ability to help auditors detect fraudulent reporting.  He 
concluded that auditors that used expert systems made better decisions that were more 
consistent with their assessment of risk than did auditors that used either checklists or 
logistic regression, or no decision aids.  Kuhn and Sutton describe how Continuous 
Auditing techniques could have been used to detect WorldCom's business transactions 
that did not conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and 




There are many other types of risks that plague corporations.  For example, one 
recent Delphi study, using 37 professionals, identified 86 separate threats in 11 different 
categories that potentially are important for the next decade (Turoff 2012).  Most of these 
threats would materially and adversely affect the corporation’s ability to operate 
normally. 
3.4.5 More Frequent Audited Disclosures 
Electronic commerce, electronic data interchange and the Internet are dramatically 
changing an organization’s business practices for record keeping.  As more of an 
organization's record keeping becomes digitized, the processes of collecting audit 
information, assuring its accuracy and disseminating financial reports to stakeholders can 
be highly automated.  The automation of the financial reporting process could enable 
financial reports to be released more frequently.  Currently, most companies release 
unaudited financial reports quarterly and audited financial reports annually.  However, 
increasingly stakeholders require more timely communication of financial information, 
which requires auditors to invent new ways to continuously monitor, gather and analyze 
audit evidence (Rezaee 2002).   
An experiment conducted by (Hunton 2002) demonstrated the potential value of 
more frequent financial reporting.  He concludes that monthly financial reporting even 
without assurance (i.e., unaudited), would significantly enhance the usefulness of 
financial statements, improve the quality of earnings, reduce managements’ 
aggressiveness with respect to accounting accruals and estimates, reduce stock price 




organizations cost of capital.  These effects were more pronounced if the monthly 
financial statements were accompanied by assurance (i.e., audited). 
(Botosan 1997) examine the association between disclosure levels and the cost of 
equity by regressing estimates on an organization’s cost of equity on market betas (i.e., 
its non-diversifiable risk) and firm size.  Botosan’s analysis of 122 manufacturing firms 
supports the theory that an increase in financial disclosures is correlated with a lower cost 
of equity.  After controlling for market beta and the organization’s size, the magnitude of 
the disclosure effect is negatively correlated with approximately 28 basis points change in 
the cost of equity.  However, organizations that had the most financial analysts covering 
them had no significant relationship between disclosure levels and cost of equity capital. 
(Elliott 2002) states the potential downside associated with more frequent 
disclosures of financial reports: the potential to place the organization at a competitive 
disadvantage, the high cost of developing, processing and distributing frequent financial 
reports, and the risk of liability from its disseminations.  Moreover, a field study of three 
publicly traded firms reveals that only 10.6% of internal accounting professionals are 
receptive to making financial statements available to external users on a more frequent 
basis than quarterly and only 16.3% believe that the benefits of more frequent reporting 
would outweigh the costs, even though most accounting and information technology 
professionals believe that it is technically feasible to do so (Chan and Wright 2007). 
Given the few audited disclosures, stock prices are routinely influenced by non-
audited information, which at times can be of dubious quality.  For example, microcap 
stocks, which notoriously lack publicly available audit information, have been plagued by 




including spam, paid promoters, cold calling, and/or dubious press releases to artificially 
increase a company’s stock prices ahead of their sell off (SEC 2014).  More frequent and 
widely distributed audited information could lead to more efficient markets by impeding 
dubious information’s ability to sway stock prices. 
3.4.6 Improved Trust 
(Power 1999) asserts that the United Kingdom is in the midst of an “Audit Explosion” 
because of a lack of trust.  He suggests that auditing has been increasingly used to restore 
trust in situations where resources are entrusted but trust is lacking.  However, all 
auditing has explicit costs.  Societies that have tried to institutionalize auditing on a grand 
scale have slowly crumbled under the weight and cost of their information validation 
demands.  The over-allocation of scarce resources to surveillance activities and the sheer 
human exhaustion of perpetual audit activities seem to outweigh their benefits.  He 
asserts that the traditional audit process invests too heavily in shallow rituals of 
verification at the expense of other forms of organizational intelligence.  The ultimate 
goal of an audit program should be to open up an organization to independent and 
external scrutiny thereby establishing broad-based trust, which obviates the need for 
costly auditing.  
Some have provided examples that Continuous Auditing could improve 
organizational trust.  Continuous Auditing systems could monitor service level 
agreements, contractual obligations and/or loan covenants between organizations, which 
should improve trust between counterparties.  For example, (Coletti, Sedatole et al. 2005) 
suggests and provides evidence that control systems between organizations can increase 




ventures.  Moreover, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) describes a continuous debt covenant 
monitoring system that a lender could use to verify that a borrower complies with the 
covenant agreements. 
3.5 Adoption 
Many believe Continuous Auditing is the future of auditing.  Continuous Auditing 
techniques can be applied to a wide breadth of domain spaces.  On one extreme 
Continuous Auditing has been used in very specific and well-defined domains (e.g., 
WebTrust and SysTrust).  WebTrust’s sole purpose is to provide assurance on a website’s 
privacy and consumer protection procedures, while SysTrust provides assurance on a 
website’s security, availability and processing integrity (WebTrust.org 2009). 
At the other extreme, Continuous Auditing could be the basis for an 
organization’s enterprise-wide Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) program 
(Caldwell 2009).  Gartner defines Governance as the process by which policies are set 
and decision-making is executed; Risk Management as the process for addressing risks 
by either mitigation through the application of controls, transference through insurance 
and/or acceptance through a governance mechanisms; and, Compliance as the process of 
adhering to policies that can be derived from internal directives, procedures and 
requirements or external laws, regulations, standards and agreements (Caldwell 2009).  A 
full-blown GRC Continuous Auditing installation at an arbitrarily complex Fortune 500 
company would be a gigantic endeavor.   
On an even grander scale, (Hulstijn, Christiaanse et al. 2011) explain how 
Continuous Auditing could be used to ensure regulatory compliance through the entire 




slaughterhouse, meat packing and retail).  Hulstijn’s example crosses several distinct and 
independent organizations that constitute the Netherlands’ meat packing industry. 
However, the adoption rate of Continuous Auditing has been slow.  A KPMG 
survey indicated that fraud detection was the biggest factor driving adoption of 
Continuous Audit systems.  The other drivers listed include: Enterprise Risk 
Management, Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, compliance with internal policies and 
procedures and regulatory compliance (2010).  A 2003 survey of internal auditors 
conducted by the Institute of Internal Auditors Research found that 79.4% of the 
respondents used some form of computer assisted audit techniques and 39.9% use 
computer-based monitoring and exception reporting in their departments (Warren 2003).  
(Baksa, Turoff et al. 2010) summarizes three successful Continuous Audit 
implementations at AT&T, RCMP and Siemens.  Kent and Zahid speculate how 
Continuous Auditing could be embedded into health care systems (Kent, Zahid et al. 
2011).  The Financial Executive Research Foundation explored 11 successful Continuous 
Auditing implementations at American Electric Power, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
North Carolina, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Hallmark Cards, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, 
Intel, Microsoft, J.C. Penney, United Technologies Corporation and Wells Fargo 
(Ramamoorti 2010). 
The transition from traditional auditing techniques to Continuous Auditing is most 
likely going to be a slow evolution rather than a dramatic metamorphosis.  Kuenkaikaew 
posits a four stage audit maturity model.  In Stage 1 is the traditional audit, where 
assurance is predicated on financial reports presented by management (Kuenkaikaew 




assurance is predicated on verification of quantified controls and operational results.  In 
Stage 4 assurance is provided by a Continuous Audit with a meta-control structure and 
audit by exception. 
3.5.1 Success Criteria 
A KPMG whitepaper (2010) defines several potential success criteria for a Continuous 
Auditing implementation.  KPMG defines financial success criteria (e.g., positive 
financial return on investment for the project) as well as non-financial success criteria 
(e.g., improved employee compliance with policies and procedures).  The positive return 
on investment could stem from a reduction in the Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs, 
increase prevention of fraud, reduction in the labor costs required to complete an audit, 
and the cost savings associated with the enhanced ability to detect control failures quickly 
before they have the chance to escalate into a costly issue.  Over the course of the 
Continuous Auditing system’s lifecycle success metrics, such as the ones listed above, 
could be continually evaluated to determine the overall effect of this system on the 
organization. 
(Krell 2009) offers the following five suggestions to improve the adoption of a 
Continuous Auditing implementation:  
1. Establish highly visible executive support.   
2. Communicate with business process owners to identify areas of greatest 
need (i.e., most important risks).   
3. Start small in a specific area with receptive business process owners.   
4. Understand that the technology will likely identify "false positives" on the 
first several cuts; weed these out as the application is iteratively optimized.   
5. Communicate the errors and issues identified to business process owners 





3.5.2 System Acceptance 
In order for Continuous Auditing to become a mainstream application, it will have to 
overcome the system acceptance issues that plague all new information technology 
projects.  Continuous Auditing could be used by many different stakeholders and may 
face resistance along many different fronts.  The three biggest potential stakeholders are 
organizations, big accounting firms, and auditors (external and internal).  Each of these 
stakeholders has individual needs and desires that will help shape their reaction to a 
Continuous Auditing system. 
Also, for a Continuous Auditing system to be effective, it would not only have to 
be proficient at auditing, but it would also have to be trusted and relied on by its 
stakeholders.  Trust in computer systems, especially new ones, can be problematic.  For 
example, six months before 40 million credit cards were stolen from Target, it spent $1.6 
million on a sophisticated and well-known anti-malware system that detected the attack 
and warned the appropriate personal, who took no action.  In fact, this software could 
have automatically removed the malware without any human interaction.  However, this 
feature was disabled, presumably because it was mistrusted by Target’s security 
personnel, even  though it was adequately tested both on Target’s infrastructure as well as 
at numerous other companies (Riley, Elgin et al. 2014) (Smith 2014). 
3.5.3 Organizational 
Acceptance of an information technology system within an organization has been well 
documented in the Information Systems literature.  Specifically, (Bailey James 1983) 
identified the five system attributes that lead to the highest user satisfaction with a 




• Accuracy - The correctness of the system’s output. 
• Reliability - The consistency and the dependability of system’s outputs. 
• Timeliness - The output of information in a time suitable for its use. 
• Relevance - The degree of congruence between what a user wants or 
requires and what is provided by the system. 
• Confidence in the System - The user’s feeling of assurance or certainty 
about the system. 
  
Therefore, other things being equal, a Continuous Auditing system that exhibits a high 
degree of these attributes should be more accepted than one that ranks low on them. 
(Venkatesh, Morris et al. 2003) developed and tested a Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT), which can be used as a starting point to 
understand the potential system acceptance issues that a Continuous Auditing system 
could encounter.  Four constructs were identified as direct determinants of user intention 
and usage behavior:  
• Performance Expectancy (the degree to which an individual believes that 
using the system will help him/her attain gains in job performance). 
• Effort Expectancy (the degree of effort associated with using and learning 
the system).  
• Social Influence (the degree to which an individual perceives that 
important constituents believe he or she should use the system). 
• Facilitating Conditions (the degree to which an individual believes that an 
organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support use of the 
system). 
 
Gender, age, voluntariness and experience are key moderators of these four direct 
determinants.  Performance Expectancy is moderated by gender and age.  This 
relationship is more significant for men and younger workers.  The Effort Expectancy is 
moderated by gender, age and experience.  This relationship is more significant for 
women and older workers, and those with limited experience.  The Social Influence is 




workers, under conditions of mandatory use, and those with limited experience.  The 
effect of facilitating conditions is moderated by age and experience.  This relationship 
was more significant for older workers and those with more experience (Venkatesh, 
Morris et al. 2003). 
Consequently, UTAUT predicts high behavioral intention to use a new 
Continuous Auditing System when the end-users believe that the Continuous Auditing 
system is easy to use and well supported in terms of organizational and technical 
infrastructure, will improve their efficiency and effectiveness at work, and is supported 
by senior management.  The prediction that a successful Continuous Auditing system 
implementation benefits from the support of an executive champion is consistent with the 
empirical research conducted by financial executives research foundation (Ramamoorti 
2010). 
3.5.4 The Big Four Auditing Firms 
The big four accounting firms are PwC, Deloitte and Touche, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG.  Collectively in 2011, these firms had revenues of over $100 billion and 
employed over 640,000 employees.  Table 3.1 summarizes this information. 








PWC $29.2 169 2011 (Davies 2011) 
Deloitte & Touche $28.8 182 2011 (2011) 
Ernst & Young $22.9 152 2011 (2011) 
KPMG $22.7 138 2010 (Flynn 2011) 





Over the years, these large auditing firms have built a large and global industry, and 
amassed substantial intellectual property around performing traditional audits.   
Historically, these firms have been resistant to new technologies that could 
potentially jeopardize their business model.  For example, (Fischer 1996) observed that 
large auditing firms had a reluctance to place reliance on more sophisticated and/or 
effective audit procedures even when they were readily available.  Their preferences 
tended to be anchored on the audit procedures and processes that have been performed in 
the past.  Moreover, (Hall 2003) suggests that adoption of a new invention might be 
slowed if it requires new and complex skills.  This inertia and resistance to new 
technologies could be a barrier to Continuous Auditing acceptance.  Finally, the Big 4 
audit firms may be resistant to Continuous Auditing’s tenant of reviewing all the 
transactions, because this practice could complicate their legal defenses for overlooking a 
material financial misstatement. 
(Dowling and Leech 2007) review of audit support systems may provide insight 
into the performance expectancy for a Continuous Auditing system from the perspective 
of the big audit firms.  They conducted semi-structured interviews with four partners and 
four managers from five audit firms, which included a Big 4 and one mid-tier 
international audit firm.  Continuous Auditing systems perceived benefits were enhanced 
audit quality, increased audit efficiency, higher audit consistency, better risk 
management, improved documentation and increased checks and balances on junior staff.  
On the contrary, their perceived limitations include fostering mechanistic behavior as 
opposed to judgment, significant training time, technology challenges, cost prohibitive 




One study suggests possible means to overcome these audit firm’s inertia and 
initial resistance to new technologies.  Curtis and Payne analyzed the acceptance in 
auditing firms of Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs), which leverages 
technology similar to what is used for a Continuous Auditing system (Curtis and Payne 
2008).  CAAT applies this technology within the context of a traditional periodic audit 
while Continuous Auditing uses this technology to perform audits on a continuous basis.  
He concludes that the acceptance of CAAT improves when superiors voice their approval 
for the new CAAT software, and longer-term budget and evaluation periods are used.  
Longer evaluation periods are necessary, because these implementations typically have 
high front-loaded costs.  In the early periods, these startup costs more than outweigh the 
overall efficiency gains and improvements in audit quality.  However, over time the 
system implementation and maintenance costs tend to dramatically decrease while the 
efficiency gains remain constant.  For a well-designed system, the total economic benefits 
of the system tend to surpass its total costs in some future period. 
3.5.5 Auditors 
Using Continuous Auditing systems will require new skills, technical competencies and 
attitudes for both internal and external auditors.  Continuous Auditing will require 
auditors to be open to adopt risk-based assurance principles and have a fundamental 
understanding of Information Technology concepts and methodologies.  Specifically 
auditors need to be able to teach themselves new technical solutions, perform data 
extractions, use statistical analytical tools, and understand ERPs and mid-level 
accounting packages (Vasarhelyi, Teeter et al. 2010).  The Unified Theory of Acceptance 




lower Effort Expectancy (see Subsection 3.5.3) for using Continuous Auditing systems.  
As such, they will be less resistant to this technology than auditors that do not have these 
skills. 
Another potential reason that auditors might resist a Continuous Auditing system 
is, as automation increases audit efficiencies, there could be a corresponding decrease in 
the demand for auditors.  Similar to the way machines reduced the demand for physical 
labor, some have argued that as machines take over mental labor, there will be a 
corresponding and irrevocable reduction in the demand for knowledge workers (Ford 
2009).  Applying this line of reasoning to the audit profession, if Continuous Auditing 
has large-scale success in fully automating the audit process, there could be a sharp 
decrease in demand for the traditional auditor’s skill set.  If auditors perceive a dire threat 
to their livelihood, they may staunchly resist the new system. 
3.6 Challenges 
Although Continuous Auditing implementations are occurring, their adoption is slower 
than expected (Warren 2003).  Consequently, Continuous Auditing still has not been 
widely adopted in corporate America, in spite of the fact that audit experts and software 
vendors have touted its benefits for over a decade (Whitehouse 2010).  However, one 
study showed that Continuous Auditing techniques are emerging in some internal audit 
departments, but much opportunity for additional proliferation (Vasarhelyi, Alles et al. 
2012).   
There are currently many technological, economic and logistical challenges facing 
Continuous Auditing.  Some examples include unclear benefits, high implementation 




benefits and difficulties with data capture and mapping data between large and disparate 
data sources (Penler 2006).  Like all information system projects, Continuous Auditing 
systems must balance innovation with efficiency, perpetually reconcile changing and 
often conflicting user needs, and make difficult technology choices in a constantly 
evolving landscape, which leads to unanticipated needs for new employee skills, user 
training, the re-allocation of personnel and resources and the need to retire or integrate 
with dated technologies (Patten 2009).  Most large Information Systems projects have 
material cost overruns or schedule overruns.  Moreover, roughly 17% of large 
Information Systems projects go so badly that they threaten the existence of the entire 
company (Bloch 2012).  The following subsections explore the challenges that have been 
described in the Continuous Auditing literature.  
3.6.1 Cost 
In September 2008, the Economist asked 446 senior executives about their views on the 
drawbacks of investing in standardizing/automating their financial processes (Fedorowicz 
2008).  The number one drawback was the high level of investment required, which 48% 
of the respondents gave as their answer.  It was twice as much as the number two answer, 
difficulty of modeling complex financial processes.  Consequently, it is clear that the cost 
of implementing a Continuous Auditing system is a formidable obstacle.  One possible 
approach to overcoming this cost objection is to phase the system in over time.  In the 
early phases of system development, the system implementer focuses on building the 
high-value components and phases in the other lower value components over time.  
While this approach does not directly lower the total cost of ownership, it does lower the 




Another approach to overcoming cost objections is to highlight the cost of doing 
nothing.  As Subsection 3.4.1 points out, there are tangible and intangible cost savings 
associated with automating manual processes.  Moreover, Gartner suggests that 
organizations that utilize a piecemeal approach to achieve their compliance initiatives 
will likely spend ten times more on their compliance projects than an organization that 
takes a more integrated approach (Brace 2006).  Table 3.2 compares the costs of 
traditional auditing techniques with those of Continuous Auditing.  Other things being 
equal, the cost effectiveness case for Continuous Auditing seems to improve as the 
organization’s scale increases. 
Table  3.2 Traditional and Continuous Auditing Cost Comparison 
 Traditional Auditing Continuous Auditing 
Setup Time Cost Less More 
Operating Costs Proportional with sizes of 
organization.  Fairly static 
year over year. 
High initial development 
costs, but markedly drops 
after implementation 
Cost of Audit 
Exception 
Varies based on exception 
but after-the-fact detection 
may lead to collateral cost 
Preventative and/or near 
real-time should minimize 
collateral costs of audit 
exception 
Cost to Scale Up Very little economies of 
scale 
High economies of scale.  
Minimal incremental cost to 
add more sites and/or 
controls 
 
3.6.2 Inferior to Human Decision Making 
The skeptics’ biggest criticism of Continuous Auditing is that it is not possible to fully 
automate the auditing process.  They claim that the audit process requires human 
judgment and estimation, which can never be fully automated nor done continuously 




possible problem, a human will always be needed to confirm and/or mitigate it.  For 
example, a Continuous Audit process could detect a possible fraudulent credit card 
transaction; however, a customer service representative would generally need to contact 
the customer to confirm it.  
Even a well-defined process can be difficult to automate.  For example, in spite of 
the fact that regulatory bodies painstakingly define standards and guidelines, and 
organizations spend significant resources defining their business policies and controls, 
determining whether a corporation is in compliance with a particular standard or 
guideline still requires a fair amount of human judgment.  To illustrate this point, each 
year Money magazine sends the financial records of a hypothetical family to 
approximately 50 tax preparers and asks them to determine how much this family owes in 
taxes.  In 1990, the family's tax bill ranged from $37,715 to $68,912, a difference of 83%.  
The reason for this variation is that determining income, deductions and an appropriate 
depreciation schedule is a subjective part of the tax preparer’s work.  Similarly, 
organizations face a myriad of vastly more complicated but still ambiguous accounting 
questions, whose answers can lend themselves to self-serving interpretations (Bazerman, 
Loewenstein et al. 2002). 
The skeptics’ basic premise is that some auditing data is simply too ambiguous to 
fully automate the decision process.  Peterson defines a continuum between hard and soft 
data in a financial context (Peterson 2004).  Hard data is almost always recorded 
numerically (e.g., income statements, balance sheets, etc.).  In general, it can be easily 
interpreted, summarized, and electronically collected, stored and transmitted.  




rumors, economic projections, etc.).  Soft data requires more subjective interpretation 
than hard data does.  While soft data is more costly to produce, store and interpret, 
Peterson concludes that soft data by its nature could contain more nuanced and 
potentially useful information. 
Expanding on the hard to soft data continuum (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) define 
an audit data taxonomy that has three categories: (1) Routine Hard Data: audit data that is 
clearly definable and easily interpreted and measured, (2) Non-routine Hard Data: Audit 
data that requires information from other sources to be interpretable, (3) Soft Data (i.e., 
data with a high degree of subjectivity that requires some assumptions and judgment to 
interpret).  Consequently, routine hard data is the easiest to audit and soft data is the 
hardest to audit. 
Continuous Auditing systems can easily audit routine hard data (e.g., does a user 
entering transactions into the general ledger system have the proper authority to make 
this type of transaction, have any unauthorized changes been made to key system tables, 
and are the calculations in the system performed correctly?).  At the other end of the 
spectrum, auditing soft data would likely require the application to use some form of 
artificial intelligence techniques.   
(Simon 1966) claimed back in the 1960’s that machines will be capable, within 
twenty years, of doing any work a human can do.  Although artificial intelligence, thus 
far, has not lived up to these early expectations, in some small well-defined areas it has 
been able to equal or outperform humans.  For example, the artificial intelligence 
program deep blue has beaten the world's best grandmasters at chess (Loeb 2006).  




artificial intelligence is replacing skilled practitioners in fields such as law, medicine and 
aviation (Dewhurst and Willmott 2014).  For example, pilots are flying airplanes less and 
less because they rely more and more on flight automation that has become reliable and 
efficient, and eliminates the risk of pilot fatigue.  However, these automation controls are 
not foolproof.  Some have believe that they played a role in the 2009 Air France crash 
that killed 228 passengers, which paints a cautionary tale of the perils of designing an 
automated control system that does not cleanly mesh with our innate human 
understanding or the world (Wise 2011).   
Recent advances in deep learning techniques have led to renewed enthusiasm 
among researchers that automating some types of human tasks is becoming increasingly 
plausible in the foreseeable future (Markoff 2012).  Some have predicted that Artificial 
Intelligence will reach human level by 2029 (Devlin 2015).  Others have even heralded 
the next wave of artificial intelligence that could result in a paradigm shift for senior 
executives (McKinsey 2014).  However, it still remains unclear whether similar 
technology could be used to create superior artificially intelligent auditors. 
One formidable obstacle is that complex business decisions may require multi-
criteria decision-making, which refers to decisions that have conflicting criteria and 
require implicit or explicit tradeoffs between competing objectives. These types of 
decisions generally require the aggregation of input from various disparate parties that 
very well may have sharply different views, responsibilities and objectives.  Benjamin 
Franklin suggested a process to make a multi-criteria decision: simplifying the decision 
process by simultaneously removing even swaps from a decision’s pros and cons column 




champions a humbled decision making model, which has been used by physicians for 
centuries (Etzioni 2001).  This model requires an understanding of organizational goals 
and policies, and advocates small, nonbinding and experimental decisions based on in-
depth examination of a focused subset of facts and possible decisions. 
A contemporary solution to the multi-criteria decision-making problem, which 
was suggested by emergency management research, is to combine a real-time decision 
support system that provides consistent and comprehensive information with a structured 
approach that allows experts to model decisions and their effects (Roethlisberger 1939).  
Turoff defines a theoretical emergency management system that combines decision 
support templates, Continuous Auditing of a predefined set of emergency preparedness 
controls and Continuous Auditing of the decision process to establish oversight and 
accountability (Turoff 2004). 
3.6.3 Automation Issues 
Software developers have relied on automated testing tools to validate the correctness of 
a software project.  Continuous integration, which is a software engineering practice that 
advocates implementing continuous processes as a means for quality control, has been 
pushing the boundaries of automation in software development.  Continuous integration 
recommends automating the build and unit testing processes such that they are 
automatically executed every time a software module is changed.  One of the advantages 
of continuous integration is software bugs emerge early in the development process.  
However, the disadvantages are increased set up time, and the cost of developing an 





Continuous Auditing, which aspires to a much grander scale of automation, will 
likely face similar, if not materially more difficult, automation challenges.  The cost of 
developing and maintaining automated tests have been higher than expected (Ramler and 
Wolfmaier 2006).  There is the upfront cost of determining which automation tool to buy 
and learning how to use it.  Then, there is the ongoing cost of developing, executing and 
maintaining the automated tests.  Developing a suite of automated tests generally require 
costly, highly specialized and technically competent resources that understand the testing 
tool as well as the underlying domain space.   
Even highly automated tests still require a fair amount of human supervision.  For 
example, each time the test suite is executed the results need to be carefully reviewed to 
determine the false positives from the real issues.  Moreover, automated tests may also 
require human intervention to fix broken tests and resolve technical snafus such as 
memory problems, network glitches and, perhaps, even bugs with the testing tool itself.  
Changes to the underlying information technology systems or the audit objectives are 
likely to necessitate a corresponding change in the tests suite as well. 
Automated tests tend to be rigid.  In general, automated tests have difficulty 
coping with rapidly changing environments or environments where the underlying 
domain space is not well understood.  In these environments, automated testing may not 
even be a viable option (Bach 1999).  Berner and Weber concludes that automated testing 
cannot fully replace manual testing (Berner, Weber et al. 2005).  They also point out that 
the capability to run automated test cases diminishes, if they are not used.  In conclusion, 
automated testing has been effective in certain domains; however, it has some systemic 




to implement a Continuous Auditing system will wrestle with the same type of 
automation issues, albeit on a grander scale, as what test engineers encountered when 
they build automated test scripts for Information Systems.  
Having to regularly update and improve a Continuous Auditing system is 
probably inevitable except for the extremely rare environment that never changes and is 
totally free from the surprises caused by human missteps, competing organizations and 
natural events.  Therefore, model and test updates probably should be viewed as a routine 
exercise that if not done regularly will cause the accuracy of the system to steadily decay. 
Practically speaking, there probably should be a periodic recheck of automated predictive 
models at least once a year to verify the fidelity of their forecasts. 
Finally, Exception Reporting, which was first proposed by the father of scientific 
management (Taylor 1911), highlights the inherent problem of defining exactly what 
“exceptions” to a business process are (Gorr 2009).  The number of possible exceptions is 
nearly infinite.  Even with large-scale data mining, there is always the possibility that an 
abnormal finding has not yet been captured in an organizational database, which greatly 
exasperates the modeling process.   
3.6.4 System Performance 
Adding Continuous Auditing controls and/or data extraction methods (see Subsection 
4.2.3) to an existing IT system may negatively impact system performance.  Hoxmeier 
concludes that user satisfaction with an IT system decreases as response time increases 
(Hoxmeier 2000).  In the best case, lengthy system response times will lower user 




(Murthy 2004) examined the system performance implications of adding three 
types of controls (calculations, database lookups, and aggregate function controls) to an 
e-commerce application.  Calculation controls make comparisons between the current 
transaction and data retrieved from a single database lookup.  Lookup controls are similar 
to calculation controls but require data from multiple tables.  Aggregate function controls 
compare transaction values to the average, sum, maximum and/or minimum of a 
particular field.  For example, one aggregate control compares the customer’s current 
transaction amount to the customer’s average historical amount.  Murthy concludes that 
calculation controls could be accommodated, regardless of system load.  Lookup controls 
had a detrimental effect on system performance only during peak periods.  Aggregate 
function controls had a dramatic negative impact on system performance irrespective of 
the system load. 
However, as information technology systems continue to become more powerful, 
the system performance concerns over Continuous Auditing may diminish in materiality.  
Today’s highly scalable and distributed computing grids can quickly process a 
tremendous amount of data.  For example in 2011, Facebook processed over 30 billion 
pieces of content each month (Manyika, Chui et al. 2011). 
3.6.5 Formalizing Business Processes 
A September, 2008 Economist study asked 446 senior executives their opinions on how 
to improve financial processes.  In response to the question “What is the biggest problem 
with current financial processes?” the top three issues were: (1) Too many manual 
processes (2) Complex procedures which are difficult to model or automate  
(3) Inconsistent methodologies around the organization (Fedorowicz 2008). 
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Continuous Auditing strives to mitigate these issues through the formalization of 
business processes, controls and audit exceptions.  Knowledge Management, which has 
been extensively researched (Malone, Crowston et al. 2003), attempts to formalize, 
organize, describe and leverage the intellectual capital that has been embedded in 
business process routines and machinery (Davenport and Prusak 2000) and could serve as 
a basis for a Continuous Auditing system.  In general, formalization promotes precision 
and consistency, improves confidence in audit results and reduces long run audit costs. 
Once a business process has been formalized, it can usually be automated. 
Unfortunately,  many humans resist formal thinking, formalization can be very laborious 
and costly and some complex judgments are not amenable to formalization (Alles, 
Brennan et al. 2006).  Consequently, formalizing manual audit procedures to facilitate 
automation is much more difficult than might have been anticipated (Alles, Brennan et al. 
2006). 
Conventional audit programs may not be designed for automation because 
formalization and judgmental procedures are often intermixed.  In order to optimally 
automate the audit process, the whole process may need to be reengineered.  Wherever 
practical, continuous automated procedures should be relied on, and manual methods 
and informal judgmental procedures should be eliminated (Alles 2008).   
3.6.6 Information Overload 
Continuous Auditing systems could increase the quantity of data available for analysis, 
which could cause information overload.  Information overload occurs when the volume 
of information supplied in a given unit of time exceeds the limited human information 
processing capacity, which tends to lead to confused and dysfunctional behavior (Jacoby, 
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Speller et al. 1974).  Chewning and Harrell demonstrated that an overload of accounting 
data leads to decreased decision quality in accounting students (Chewning and Harrell 
1990). 
The Information Systems literature explores possible solutions to the information 
overload problem: installing voting structures to evaluate information (Hiltz and Turoff 
1985), using decision support systems (Cook 1993) or intelligent agents to limit 
alternatives (Edmunds and Morris 2000), providing flexible information organization, 
filtering and routing options (Hiltz and Turoff 1985), utilizing data visualization tools 
(Chan 2001), creating a measurement system for information quality (Denton 2001), 
compressing, aggregating and categorizing data (Grise and Gallupe 1999), defining 
decision models (Chewning and Harrell 1990) or exception reporting (Ackoff 1967), and 
using search procedures (Olsen, Sochats et al. 1998). 
Siemens designed their Continuous Auditing system to prevent information 
overload by implementing an exception-based approach built around intelligent alarms.  
When critical exceptions occur, the system automatically generates alarms, which are 
emailed to all relevant parties.  To prevent alarm floods, which occur when the same 
alarm is repeatedly sounded, from hampering the ability to react to the underlying 
problems and, in the worst case, having the alarm ignored altogether, a hierarchical alarm 
structure was implemented where each node has an enabled/disabled flag.  Disabling the 
node prevents its children’s alarms from sounding, thereby preventing alarm floods.  
Moreover, the system intelligently monitors alarms, waits a predefined amount of time 
before re-sounding an alarm and initiates escalation procedures if an alarm is not resolved 








This chapter surveys the enabling Information System technologies for Continuous 
Auditing and Monitoring systems.  At the highest level all Information Systems require a 
software architecture.  A software architecture is defined as “the fundamental 
organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relationships to each other 
and the environment, and the principles governing its design and evolution” (ANSI/IEEE 
2000, p. 3).  Although much has been written about empirical and theoretical Continuous 
Auditing architectures, there is still disagreement on the optimal system architecture.  
Gartner defines the critical capabilities of the Continuous Auditing system as: Detection 
and Preventing of Conflicting Privileges (i.e., ensuring that an employee does not have 
system access that violates the organization’s Segregation of Duty (SOD) policy), 
transaction monitoring (i.e., periodically run predefined analytics to identify control 
exceptions), auditor and management workflows (i.e., supports tracking and remediation 
audit exceptions) and cross-platform integration (i.e., the ability to extract data and track 
business processes across multiple ERP systems and home-grown financial application) 
(Proctor and Caldwell 2010). 
(Alles, Kogan et al. 2004) generically describe the seven components of a 
Continuous Auditing system:  
1. A layer of software (aimed at process control and monitoring) on top of 
the most critical corporate software systems. 
2. An instantiation of the control and monitoring process aimed at business 




3. A constant stream of measurements (metrics) engineered out of key 
processes. 
4. A sophisticated dynamic set of standards (models) to compare with the 
metrics. 
5. A set of dynamic exception metrics to determine when an alarm is to be 
issued, and its degree of importance. 
6. An analytic layer to perform additional analysis related to several 
corporate functions (auditing, fraud evaluation, accounting rule 
compliance, estimate review). 
7. A new level of statutory reporting that may include reports to 
governmental agencies. 
 
One possible extension of this approach is to incorporate periodic revalidation of the 
model’s efficacy on a regular basis.  This review should be consistent with the rate of 
external changes that affect the organization’s operation.   
(Warren 2005) describes a web enabled software architecture that receives a 
continuous feed of data from a variety of enterprise systems and performs Continuous 
Auditing, audits and control checks on this data.  Ye posits that a Service-Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) Continuous Auditing architecture would provide faster business 
value, rapid response capabilities and reuse (Huanzhuo Ye 2008).  Woodroof and Searcy 
adds the concept of continually combining data from multiple disparate organizations 
(Woodroof and Searcy 2001).  The auditor’s website aggregates information from three 
disparate entities (the client, its supplier, and an independent valuation engine) to 
generate Continuous Auditing reports.  Alles and Brennan adds the notion that 
formalizable procedures should be separated from non-formalizable ones, where the 
formalizable controls are executed with high frequency (perhaps continuously), while 
non-formalizable ones should continue to be done manually and periodically (Alles, 




4.2 Information Management 
(Marchand, Kettinger et al. 2000) defines Information management capability as the 
ability to provide data and information to users with the appropriate level of accuracy, 
timeliness, reliability, security and confidentiality.  An effective Continuous Auditing 
system would require strong information management and governance practices 
(Caldwell, Wheatman et al. 2009).  Although today's organizations are not entirely 
paperless, technologies such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce 
(EC), and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) are greatly increasing the number of digitized 
audit trails while simultaneously reducing the number of paper based ones.  Redgrave 
estimates that 93% of information created today is in a digital form, 70% of an 
organization's records are stored electronically and 30% of electronically stored 
information is never printed (Redgrave 2005).  The trend towards digitizing an 
organization’s audit trails is a necessary prerequisite to Continuous Auditing, because at 
the core of any Continuous Auditing system is electronically stored data.  If this 
electronic data can be properly aggregated and structured, it could likely be used to 
satisfy multiple governance and business reporting needs (Hannon 2005). 
4.2.1 Big Data 
The global economy is generating a tremendous volume of transactional data, which 
includes trillions of bytes of information about customers, suppliers and business 
processes.  If this data can be appropriately harvested, it could be transformed into a 
major corporate asset.  For example, GE turned the 50 million data points generated from 
the ten million sensors embedded in the wide array of products it has sold into an 




Big Data seeks to analyze and create value from a massive data set.  However, big 
data has some notable limitations: It increases the number of spurious statistically 
significant correlations, has difficulty modeling the strength of social relationships and 
understanding the contextual decision-making framework.  Moreover, Big Data can be 
riddled with some latent predispositions and perceptual biases imbued by its creator and 
will be of only marginal usefulness in black swan events (i.e., novel situations where no 
pre-existing representative data exists) (Brooks 2013).  Finally in the audit context, 
exhaustingly analyzing Big Data sets could generate a prohibitive number of audit 
exceptions, which would be difficult to manually review and process on either timely or 
cost effective basis. 
Two of the objectives of Big Data research are similar to the goals of Continuous 
Audit: 1) Creating Organizational Transparency by making the data more understandable 
to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner. 2) Replacing/supporting human decision 
making with automated algorithms that could lead to improved decision making, 
minimized operational risks, and potentially lead to new and valuable insights (Manyika, 
Chui et al. 2011). 
4.2.1 Database Management Systems 
A Continuous Auditing system will almost certainly require some form of Database 
Management System (e.g., SQLServer, Oracle, DB2, etc.).  Alles and Brennan propose 
that a large relational database application is an appropriate tool for an Audit Data 
Repository (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006).  Most modern database systems have SQL-based 
querying capabilities that allow selecting, aggregating and filtering the data stored in the 




Transform and Load (ETL), Data Warehouse, Data Mining and Predictive Modeling.  
Warren suggested that these capabilities could be key components of a Continuous 
Auditing System (Warren 2003).  ETL tools help extract data from other IT systems, 
transform it into the current database model and load the data into a database.  A Data 
Warehouse organizes information stored in the database to facilitate end-user reporting 
and analytics.  Data Mining is a systematic process for extracting patterns from data (e.g., 
fraudulent transactions).  Predictive modeling creates a model based on the underlying 
data that is used to predict future results, activity or behavior. 
4.2.2 Data Sources 
Few organizations have a completely homogeneous system environment. In an (ACL 
2006) survey of 858 audit executives in organizations with annual revenues in excess of 
$100 million, over half of the respondents (58%) felt that fragmented and incomplete data 
was an extremely important issue facing their organization; 28% felt it was important; 
11% indicated it was slightly important; and only 3% of respondents felt that this was not 
a key challenge in their organization at this time.  
Typically, organizations have a complex IT environment, which could be 
composed of a hodgepodge of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems or perhaps 
multiple instances of the same ERP, mainframe systems, off the shelf applications and 
legacy systems, all of which may contain valuable data to the auditor (ACL 2006).  Some 
of the Continuous Auditing literature mentions the concept of an Audit Data Repository, 




Practically speaking, the economics of saving, organizing and managing all this 
data could be prohibitively expensive.  Moreover, there could be political problems that 
stem from providing auditors unfettered access to this information.  Alles and Brennan 
posits the greatest opportunity for reducing the volume of data stored in an Audit Data 
Repository is adjusting the retention requirements such that data is only retained if it 
generates exceptions that require follow-up.  Since all other data is purged, the total data 
stored, and potential security and confidentiality risks are reduced (Alles, Brennan et al. 
2006). 
A couple of papers have described Continuous Auditing systems that were based 
on ERP systems.  Kuhn described a hypothetical Continuous Auditing system built on top 
of an ERP system similar to the one used by WorldCom (Kuhn 2006).   Alles and 
Brennan describe Siemens’ Continuous Auditing system built on top of their SAP 
systems (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006). 
(Rezaee 2002) proposes a data mart that does not necessarily require an ERP 
system.  Data marts collect and transform data from various business units.  The data are 
transformed and stored in an audit data server for easy access, analysis, and reporting. An 
integrated audit data mart must have the following characteristics: 
• Integrated query, analysis, and reporting through a unified user interface,
• Easy-to-use yet powerful enough for the most sophisticated analytical
users,
• Capacity to easily export queries to common spreadsheets and database
systems,
• A query engine capable of retrieving and processing large volumes of
data,
• Data aggregation and multidimensional database capability,
• Advanced statistical modeling and data exploration capabilities,
• Data visualization for data mining exploration,
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• The ability to drill down into different degrees of data aggregation. 
 
 
The Table 4.1 summarizes the difference between ERP and Audit Warehouse Continuous 
Auditing solutions. 
Table 4.1 ERP versus Audit Warehouse 
 ERP Audit Warehouse 
Data Storage Optimized for transactional processing Optimized for Audit Analysis 
Potential Scope of 
Data ERP System only 
All digital systems including 
multiple ERPs 
Require ETL No – All analysis is done off 
of ERP’s internal databases 
Yes – Data must be 
continually aggregated from 
multiple systems 
Data Latency Issues 
Generally no.  All analysis is 
performed on the ERP’s 
internal data stores 
Yes – Data could become stale 
between refreshes 
 
Both approaches are used in commercial applications.  Data 2 Knowledge is an 
example of a data mart without an ERP (D2K 2005).  Data 2 Knowledge transforms the 
contents of an unlimited number of log files into a single structure database.  Approva’s 
Bizrights is an example of a Continuous Auditing implementation that requires an ERP 
solution, such as Oracle, PeopleSoft, SAP or J.D. Edwards ERP.  Bizrights continually 
scans these ERP’s databases for potential audit exceptions such as duplicate payments, 
nonstandard payment terms, cash payments to vendors, invoices without purchase orders, 
etc. (Approva 2009). 
(Murthy and Groomer 2004) theorized how extensible markup language (XML) 
and Web services could be utilized to create a Continuous Auditing Web Service 
(CAWS).  CAWS could be used by an external auditor to extract data from an auditee’s 




data from other companies in the supply chain to produce a real-time assurance report for 
other counterparties (i.e., investors, analysts, financial institutions, etc.).  They suggest 
that Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) or eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language (XBRL) standards are a plausible foundation for CAWS.  In one example, they 
depicted an XBRL GL implementation that used a Data Hub (i.e., Data Mart). 
(Vasarhelyi 2004) suggests transaction tagging, which tracks transactions as they 
flow between applications, would be a useful data point for a Continuous Auditing 
system. The transaction tag for the data would include the source, description and 
validation information that would enable the Continuous Auditing system to monitor and 
evaluate data accuracy and integrity. 
4.2.3 Data Extraction 
The Continuous Auditing literature identifies two possible approaches for extracting the 
requisite data from enterprise systems:  the Embedded Audit Module (EAM) and 
Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL). Embedded audit modules capture information of 
audit significance on a continuous basis (Groomer and Murthy 1989).  
EAMs are generally application level code that is specifically written to identify 
and continually write to a log file certain key business events.  This log file is 
subsequently reviewed by auditors.  For example, EAM could be written to identify all 
purchase orders that exceed a certain predefined threshold.  Once a purchase order that 
exceeds a threshold is entered into the system being monitored an exception record would 
immediately appear on the audit log.  This file would be used by auditors to manually 




the data are extracted with minimal strain on the underlying systems in terms of 
processing time, disk IO and network bandwidth.   
Although EAM can reduce the strain of data extraction, extracting large volumes 
of data could still degrade the performance of the production system.  Using EAM 
ghosting, where the entire production system including data and system settings is cloned 
onto separate hardware could totally alleviate the data extraction burden from the 
production system.  The “ghost” production system would have EAM data extraction 
enabled and the real production environment would not.  Leveraging techniques similar 
to disaster recovery and fail over solutions, EAM ghosting could be implemented by 
either having a replica of the production hardware, (e.g., perhaps by reusing the quality 
assurance testing environment) or through virtualization (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010).  At 
predefined intervals, the data from the real production system would be copy to the ghost 
production system. 
(Debreceny, Gray et al. 2005) studied EAM within the content ERP systems.  
Kuhn extends this research to SAP’s ABAP programming language that enables the 
creation of custom audit rules that can evaluate SAP transactions in real-time, and 
generate reports and alarms when transactions violate these audit rules (Kuhn Jr and 
Sutton 2010). 
The MCL is generally implemented at the database level and periodically extracts 
all relevant data from the ERP database into a monitoring and control layer.  The MCL 
data structure is optimized to facilitate the tasks that auditors normally perform 
(Vasarhelyi 2004).  For example, an auditor could use the MCL layer to drill down to the 




security, the MCL could be stored off-site, which would make it highly resistant to 
modification and tampering, even from internal IT employees with the highest system-
level access. (Coderre 2005) identifies three less automated data extraction methods:  
1. Run copies of standard reports and save reports in electronic format for 
further analysis. 
2. Run queries or generate reports with a report writer. 
3. Obtain physical and logical access to the client system and sign on as a 
user with read-only access. 
 
The Table 4.2 summarizes the main differences between EAM and MCL data extraction 
methods. 
Table 4.2 Summary of EAM and MCL Data Extraction 
 EAM MCL 
Extract Frequency Continuously Periodically 
Extraction Point Application Level Database Level 
Data Extracted Exception Data All Data 
Primary Advantage Data extraction requires 
minimal system resources  
Data is less vulnerable to 
manipulation by enterprise 
personnel who have super-
user privileges especially 




Audit Modules are tightly 
coupled with enterprise 
system, so creating Audit 
Modules requires detailed 
understanding of the 
enterprise system. 
Requires frequent and system 
intensive data extracts.  
 
4.2.4 Information Security 
Like all of an organization’s Information Systems, a Continuous Auditing system should 
conform to the organization’s information security policy.  There have been numerous 
standards published on information security policies (Höne and Eloff 2002).  Loch and 
Carr states the primary objective of information security is to protect Information 
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Systems and its data from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification 
or destruction in order to ensure the information system’s integrity, confidentiality and 
availability (Loch, Carr et al. 1992).  
Information security has been mentioned in Continuous Auditing literature. 
Woodroof and Searcy  identifies four data security attributes for the Continuous Auditing 
system:  
1. Authorization: Information is limited to only authorized users, which can
be accomplished through passwords and/or biometric devices.
2. Confidentiality: using various encryption techniques to ensure the privacy
of transmitted information.
3. Integrity:  the ability to detect when the underlying data has been tampered
with.
4. Authentication: the ability to determine the original source of the data
(Woodroof and Searcy 2001).
For a Continuous Auditing system, (Alles 2008) adds the following security concerns: 
• Location of the Continuous Auditing hardware (i.e., the corporation’s
premises or the auditor’s premises),
• Physical access security,
• Logical access security,
• Super-user privileges,
• IT personnel access to the Continuous Auditing system’s internal security
settings.
However, Information security topics such as business continuity, disaster recovery, 
cryptography and availability have received less attention in the Continuous Auditing 
literature. 
Continuous Auditing has been used to ensure that an organization’s key 
Information Systems comply with its security policy.  Harrison states the two main 
benefits of continuously auditing an organization’s information technology controls are 
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timely notification of threatening conditions, and avoiding the high cost and low 
effectiveness task of manually sampling security logs (Harrison 2005).  Siemens uses 
Continuous Auditing techniques to monitor SAP's password and user access policies 
(Alles, Brennan et al. 2006).  Therefore, a Continuous Auditing system could be designed 
to monitor its own compliance with the organization's security policies. 
4.3 Analytical Methods 
Continuous Auditing seeks to improve the audit process by continually applying 
predefined analytical methods to impartially analyze vast amounts of data (e.g., financial 
transactions, application configuration settings and customer data).  Analytical methods 
can consider nearly an unlimited number of factors, provide deep insights and scale to 
meet the needs of even the largest company.  However, these methods can also be 
perilously misled by bad data and false assumptions (Redman 2014). 
These analytic methods are designed to identify control exceptions (Caldwell 
2009).  There is a long lineage of research that suggests just the act of continually 
monitoring a process tends to improve its overall quality.  The Hawthorne effect, where 
subjects improve an aspect of their behavior that is being experimentally measured 
simply in response to being studied and not in response to an experimental manipulation, 
was first documented in (Roethlisberger 1939).  More recently, various Total Quality 
Management processes have used continual analysis as a way to improve business 
process.  For example, Six Sigma has a five-step process:  
1. Define the process and high-level objectives, 
2. Measure key aspects of the current process, 




4. Determine what the key relationships are, 
5. Optimize the process based upon data analysis techniques (Pyzdek 2009). 
 
Using feedback to improve analytical methods is a powerful technique as evidenced by 
the steady improvement in models that predict weather.  For example, the average error 
in maximum temperature prediction was six degrees Fahrenheit in the 1970s and just 4 
degrees in 2010 (Rosenzweig 2014).   
As the time to complete an audit shrinks, the necessity of relying on fully 
automated programmatic solutions to identify audit exceptions increases.  There have 
been many research articles that have suggested various analytical methods that could be 
used in a Continuous Auditing system to identify audit exceptions.  These analytical 
methods all share the following properties: observing events in real or near real-time, 
generating alarms when exceptions occur and performing repeat tests quickly, continually 
and with low variable costs (Vasarhelyi 2004).  The following subsections describe the 
most promising analytical methods in more detail. 
4.3.1 Belief Functions 
A belief function allows the combination of evidence from several different sources to 
calculate the degree of belief that utilizes all the available evidence.  There have been 
several journal articles speculating that belief functions would be useful in a Continuous 
Audit system.  For example, (Srivastava and Shafer 1992) used a belief function 
framework to calculate the total plausibility of a material misstatement at the financial 




4.3.2 Continuity Equations 
Continuity equations use statistical models to capture relationships between various 
business processes.  They can be used to create expectation models for how data moves 
through a business process.  Continuity equations are developed using statistical methods 
(e.g., Linear Regression Modeling, Simultaneous Equation Modeling, Multivariate Time 
Series Modeling, Vector Autoregressive Model, Subset-VAR or Bayesian-VAR).   
There is a three-step process to modeling a business process with continuity 
equations:  
1. Choose a business process to model (e.g., purchasing, payments, inventory 
etc.). 
2. Define metrics to represent each process: (e.g., dollar amount of purchase 
orders, quantity of items received, or number of payment vouchers 
processed).  
3. Choose the levels of aggregation of metrics (By time: hourly, daily, 
weekly; by business unit; by customer or vendor; by type of products or 
services; etc.).  
 
The model’s prediction accuracy can be compared using statistical methods such as Mean 
Absolute Percentage Error, Mean Absolute Error or Symmetric Mean Absolute Percent 
Error. 
4.3.3 Expert Systems 
Expert Systems are an artificial intelligence technique that encapsulates the knowledge of 
one or more human experts in a series of rules.  Typically, expert systems are well suited 
for static and narrowly defined problem sets that lend themselves to analytical solutions.  
Within an auditing context, (Coderre 2009) asserts that expert systems would be well-





(Davis, Massey et al. 1997) combined the deductive power of a rule-based system 
with the inductive power of a neural net to assess the audit risk embedded in an 
organization’s control structure. Essentially, Davis calculated the probability that an 
entity’s control structure would fail to prevent or detect significant financial 
misstatements.  Siegel and Strawser use rough set theory, which is an analytical method 
that generates a compact set of rules from an empirical set of multivariate data, to 
develop decision rules for evaluating internal controls (Siegel, Strawser et al. 1998).  
These decision rules were based on expert assessment of control risk after considering 
certain control procedures surrounding the decision.  The paper concludes that these rules 
allowed non-experts to make decisions comparable to those made by firm-wide experts.  
Similarly, (Greco, Matarazzo et al. 1998) applied rough set theory to evaluate bankruptcy 
risks. 
4.3.4 Fuzzy Sets 
Fuzzy logic is an analytical method that linguistically describes a process using a 
combination of fuzzy sets and rules.  Unlike traditional logic theory, which has only a 
binary true-false set, fuzzy logic has a degree of membership construct that could assume 
any value from between zero to one inclusive.  Dhar and Stein suggests that fuzzy logic is 
an intuitive and flexible way to describe the behaviors of very complex systems.  Fuzzy 
logic has been mentioned in the Continuous Auditing literature (Dhar and Stein 1997).  
For example, (Deshmukh, Nassiripor et al. 1998) illustrates how lenders could improve 
their decision-making by using fuzzy sets to assess short-term liquidity risks. The paper 




Romine built a fuzzy logic model to determine whether an accounting firm should either 
initiate or continue a relationship with a client (Deshmukh, Romine et al. 1998). 
4.3.5 Neural Net 
Neural Nets are a predictive modeling technique that simulates the workings of the 
human mind.  Coakley used a neural net to detect material errors in monthly financial 
ratios (Coakley 1995).  Two separate journal articles used neural nets to detect concerns 
in financial statements’ ratios and values (Hian Chye and Sen Suan 1999) (Etheridge, 
Sriram et al. 2000).  Koskivaara used neural nets to recognize patterns in the monthly 
balances of financial accounts (Koskivaara 2000).   
Moreover, (Ramamoorti, Jr et al. 1999) used 26 quantitative and 19 qualitative 
risk factors as input into a neural net to assess internal auditing risk at the University of 
Illinois.  The quantitative data were extracted from the Financial and Administration 
Systems.  The qualitative risk factors were ranked by the audit staff using a Delphi, 
which was used to train the neural nets.  Ramamoorti concludes that internal auditors 
could benefit from using neural nets. 
In general, neural nets tend to perform well when, data samples and the range of 
values to be analyzed are large, the data does not conform to strict distributional 
properties and the underlying associations among the data are ill defined.  However, 
neural nets are difficult to explain conceptually (i.e., how and why they arrived at the 
conclusion they did) and do not readily allow the calculation of statistical significance for 




4.3.6 Regression-based  
Regression analysis is a predictive modeling technique based upon statistical methods.  
Knechel compared seven regression based analytical review procedures on monthly 
account balances (Knechel 1988).  When these rules identified months with inordinately 
high variance, the auditor would randomly sample and manually review the transactions 
within these periods.  Knechel concluded that allowing regression based analytical review 
procedures to guide the auditor’s transaction review was an efficient approach, because 
even in the worst-case, most analytical review procedures in spite of their smaller 
samples sizes still had only a small increase in detection risk versus traditional sampling 
techniques.  
(Vasarhelyi 2004) recommends using time series/cross-sectional analysis to 
model the normal behavior so that audit exceptions can be detected.  In general, 
regression based statistical techniques are easily explainable and their variables’ 
significance can be easily calculated.  However, regression based statistical techniques 
force the underlying data into a preselected distribution (e.g., normal, logarithmic, etc.), 
which may not fit the underlining data distribution.  
4.3.7 Qualitative 
Soft information may need to be incorporated into a Continuous Auditing system.  In this 
context, soft information is defined as management estimates and/or judgments (e.g., 
calculating and allowance for doubtful accounts or determining a new organizational risk 
are examples of auditing tasks that require a fair amount of human judgment) (Warren 
2002).  In order to incorporate soft information into a Continuous Auditing system it 




speaking it could not occur continuously, but potentially could be a source of valuable 
information that would be difficult to obtain using other analytical methods.  
One qualitative method that can be used to digitize human judgment is an 
electronic questionnaire.  An electronic questionnaire can range from a simple true-false 
questionnaire form to a complex interactive form dynamically leading the user through 
relative questions based on previous answers (Coderre 2009).  On an electronic 
questionnaire, the question types could be nominal (e.g., yes/no), ordinal (e.g., Strongly 
Agree (5) Agree (4) Neither Agree or Disagree (3) Disagree (2) Agree (1) Strongly 
Agree), interval (e.g., a scale from 1 to 100), open ended, or any combination of the 
aforementioned. 
Another electronic qualitative approach is the Delphi method, which is an 
interactive forecasting model that would rely on a panel of independent experts either 
inside or outside the organization.  These experts would answer preselected questions in 
multiple rounds.  After each round, a facilitator provides an anonymous summary of the 
expert’s forecast from the previous round as well as the reasons they provided for their 
answers.  In the next round, the panel could revise their answers based upon input from 
the previous round.  This process continues until a predefined stop criterion (e.g., 
achievement of consensus, stability of the round’s results, etc.) is reached (Linstone 
1975).  A Delphi study was used to predict the answers to some of the open questions in 
Continuous Auditing.  The Delphi predicted that by 2020, 68% of the external audits and 




The Delphi process could be used to build collaborative models that aggregate the 
collective wisdom of multiple experts, and help detect and mitigate risks.  Linstone and 
Turoff review of the current status of the Delphi method makes two important points: 
1. Collaborative Model Building is currently a major Delphi research 
objective. 
2. While the Web has ushered in the "age of participation", we need new 
types of software to get us to the "age of collaboration." (Linstone and 
Turoff 2011) 
 
Bañuls and Turoff explain how a Delphi process, Cross Impact Analysis and 
Interpretive Structure Modeling could be used to produce collaborative models (Bañuls 
and Turoff 2011).  They created dynamic scenarios with influence relationships such that 
modifying any event’s probability shows its impact to all the other events.  Bañuls, 
Turoff explore collaborative modeling within the context of a dirty bomb exploding in an 
urban area (Bañuls, Turoff et al. 2013).  It demonstrates that a group of professionals 
could build collaborative models without any programming skills.  For other types of 
risks, it may be possible to use this same technique to create working models that were 
informed by a cross-functional array of domain experts. 
4.4 Alarms 
Alarms are an early warning system that let stakeholders know when issues or 
opportunities arise that requires action.  Early warning systems must identify the key 
information to be monitored, the criteria necessary to generate the alarm, and the 
recipient, frequency and medium of the alarm.  To maximize an alarm’s utility, alarms 




Several Continuous Auditing articles describe the need for audit alarms to sound 
when an audit exception occurs.  Vasarhelyi and Halper first suggested the alarm concept 
in his continuous process auditing system developed for AT&T Bell laboratories internal 
audit department.  In this implementation, when the predefined system rules were 
violated, alarms were triggered, which were intended to call attention to this system 
anomaly.  There were four types of alarms: Type 1 alarms were minor alarms that dealt 
with the functioning of the audit system; Type 2 alarms were low-level operational 
alarms designed for operating management; Type 3 alarms were higher-level exceptions 
that were sent directly to the auditor; and Type 4 alarms warned auditors and top 
management of a serious crisis (Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991). 
In a debt covenants system, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) used alarms sent over 
the Internet to notify the lender when the borrower is potentially not in compliance with 
its debt covenant agreement.  Alles and Brennan used a hierarchical role-based approach 
to determine an alarm’s destination.  In their implementation, the alarm was always sent 
to the auditor.  The alarm could also optionally be sent to the responsible enterprise 
personnel and/or manager as well as other relevant parties.  If the alarm was not resolved 
in a timely manner, it was propagated up the organization's hierarchy.  In order to prevent 
alarm floods, which is when the same alarm is repeatedly sounded, every alarm in the 
hierarchy had an enable/disable flag.  If the flag is disabled at a point in the hierarchy, the 
alarms for all of the nodes below it are also disabled (Alles, Brennan et al. 2006). 
Other related research supports the hypothesis that alarms will be a critical part of 
a Continuous Auditing system.  For example, there is a stream of research on highly 




environment that they operate in.  Highly reliable organizations also tend to share five 
characteristics, two of which could be fostered by an effective alarm system: 
preoccupation with failure and sensitivity to operations.  These organizations tend to 
encourage reporting of errors so that they can learn from them.  They try to identify and 
respond to errors in the earliest stage, where there is often only a vague sign of trouble. 
Sensitivity to operations describes a highly reliable organizations’ constant 
concern with unexpected variability in their business processes.  Unexpected variability 
can stem from latent failures in a business process’s controls.  If latent failures are left 
uncorrected, they tend to continue and become more frequent and severe as time 
progresses.  Many times, they are only detected after a material breakdown has occurred, 
but this need not be the case.  Highly reliable organizations tend to continually and 
carefully monitor their normal operations to detect the onset of latent failures.  
Identifying and addressing latent failures in the earliest stages prevents them from 
deteriorating to the point of manifesting into catastrophic failures (Weick 2001).   
4.5 Black Box Log 
A black box audit log is a confidential log of all of an organization’s germane audit 
procedures and other economic events.  It creates a permanent and non-updatable record 
of the most important audit procedures with an audit trail of its own that is kept private 
and secure.  The benefits of a black box audit log are it would allow a tertiary monitor to 
perform peer review audit on the organization, a clear record of accounting and audit 
decisions and assist in determining accountability for a financial collapse of an 




control principles such as adequate record maintenance, separation of duties and proper 
authorization of audit activities (Alles 2003). 
Generally, black box audit logs will rely on a database management system to 
track the requisite transaction log, supporting documents and revision history of the 
aforementioned.  There are several approaches to making the database management 
systems non-updatable.  At the hardware level, EMC, IBM and NetApps sell off the shelf 
magnetic, optical and tape drives that are based on Write Once and Read Many 
(WORM) technology (Pavlou 2011).  These drives prevent the data from being modified 
once it is written.  However, (Hsu 2004) asserts that worm drives can be tampered with if 
the drive’s metadata is not also protected.  They define a fossilization process, which is a 
holistic process to managing data that ensures that it is trustworthy (i.e., has not been 
tampered with).  The three-step fossilization process is (1) ensure that all the data and 
associated metadata are reliably stored and protected from modification; (2) ensure that 
the preserved data can be quickly discovered and retrieved; (3) ensure that the preserve 
data are delivered in an intact form.  They also advanced five principles for implementing 
the fossilization process: 
1. Raise the barrier to attack. 
2. Focus on end-to-end trust. 
3. Limit what must be trusted. 
4. Use simple and well-defined interfaces between trusted and untrusted 
components. 
5. Verify all operations. 
 
There are also software solutions to prevent data tampering: (1) Cryptographic 
hash, which for an arbitrary block of data calculates an unique digital signature that 




which is a watermark that is readily destroyed when the underlying data is modified 
(Alomari 2004).  These techniques could be applied at the software level to ensure the 
data has not been tampered with. 
Another approach is to make the black box audit logs read-only, encrypted and 
under the supervision of a third party (Alles 2003).  Pavlou suggests that a Cloud Service 
Provider maybe the ideal location to store the black box audit log (Pavlou 2011).  Other 
things being equal, storing the black box audit log in the cloud would make it more 
difficult for the employees of the organization that own the data to tamper with it, if only 
because the exact physical location of the data is likely unknown to the employees of the 
organization.  Also, the Cloud maybe more scalable and distributed than the 
organization’s internal computing environment, which may provide a cost-effective and 
reliable means to store the large volumes of data that will be in most black box audit logs.  
However, storing highly sensitive information in the cloud may cause security and 
privacy concerns.  Also, it remains an open regulatory question to what extent the cloud 
service provider and the organization that uses these services are responsible and legally 
liable for ensuring proper security measures are in place to safeguard this data (Kaufman 
2009). 
Finally, some have suggested that a blockchain, which is the distributed ledger 
that empowers bitcoin, could make a secure, decentralized and distributed corporate 
ledger.  Once a transaction is published to the blockchain and confirmed as accurate, it 
cannot be reversed, altered or destroyed.  Miners, for a small fee, continually ensure the 
security of the network and confirm the legitimacy of transactions passing through the 




Therefore, there is no intermediary involved nor third party trust concerns (Lazanis 
2015). 
4.6 Control Tags 
Physical control tags (e.g., bar code readers and RFID tags) enable tracking and physical 
validation of audit objects.  For example, control tags could log the passage of an 
inventory item through key control points in the business process (e.g., tracking an 
inventory item from the warehouse to the shipping company to its ultimate destination at 
a retail outlet).  Control tags can be used to provide a continuous stream of audit 
information that can monitor the progression of physical objects through an 
organization's business process (Vasarhelyi 2004). 
Similarly, data control tags use XML to append control information about the 
transaction.  There are four unique types of data control tags:  
1. Reliability Tags: tags that provide an ongoing reliability assessment of the 
control process that generated the transaction. 
2. Tracer Tags: cookie crumbs tags that uniquely define a transaction, which 
are deposited in tracer receptacles at key processing points along the 
transaction’s path. 
3. Path Recording Tags: tags that are appended to the original transaction 
and record the key processing points that acted on it. 
4. Information Control Tags: tags that contain other control information such 
as organizational placement, name of assurer, and related transactions. 
 
A transaction can be simultaneously tagged with multiple types of the aforementioned 
control tags (Vasarhelyi 2005). 
Nanosensors could be the next generation of control tags. They are extremely 
small devices, which can be used to detect optical, spatial, and chemical information.  




clustered grids.  For example, Nanosensors could be programmed to create smart 
packaging that detects microbes, toxins, and contaminants throughout the food processing 
chain, authenticate and track products, which prevents counterfeiting and diversion of 
products destined for a specific market, and monitor key environmental factors such as 
temperature and humidity (Bowles and Lu 2014). 
4.7 Dashboard Reporting 
Dashboard reporting is an extension of the Decision Support Systems (DSS) and 
Executive Information Support research of the early 1990s.  In 1989, Howard Dresner of 
the Gartner Group described dashboard reporting as a set of concepts and methods to 
improve business decision making using fact-based support systems (Power 2007).  
Essentially, dashboard reporting uses corporate databases to assess key performance 
indicators, compare key performance indicators to their metrics and perform trend 
analysis (e.g., sales for a line of business across years).  Customized dashboards 
synthesizing deeper and more detailed operational, financial and marketing information 
could be a very valuable corporate asset.  However, these dashboards require a defined 
structure, and rules to determine what data gets highlighted and escalation (Dewhurst and 
Willmott 2014). 
These activities are very similar to the monitoring aspect of Continuous Auditing.  
The challenges of building a Dashboard report are similar to those encountered in 
building the Continuous Auditing system.  For example both systems require complete, 
accurate and timely data at the right degree of granularity, which is most likely 




One example of a decision support system was implemented by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to assess its Accounts Payable (AP) control 
framework.  The system compared cost, quality and time-based performance measures 
for each AP office.  For example, labor cost for accounts payable, the average number of 
errors per invoice and the average number of days to pay an invoice were calculated by 
extracting information for RCMP’s ERP and Human Resource systems and compared 
across offices.  Using these data analysis techniques the audit team uncovered control 
weaknesses and several instances of noncompliance with RCMP’s policy (Coderre 2006). 
4.8 Digital Agents 
In the context of Continuous Auditing, (Woodroof and Searcy 2001) define a Digital 
Agent as software that acts on behalf of the auditor in a semi-autonomous manner to 
perform a service related to the subject matter being audited.  Woodroof used an 
intelligent agent to continuously assure debt covenant compliance.  This intelligent agent 
continuously extracts accounting information from the borrower’s accounting system and 
compares it to the terms of its covenant agreement.  Potential violations in the covenant 
agreement were flagged for auditors review. 
CICA suggests that digital agents can be designed to remotely test transactions 
and controls on a continuous basis (CICA/AICPA 1999)  However, (Debreceny and Gray 
2001) state that financial information on the web may be difficult for digital agents to 
effectively use because of resource discovery (i.e., locating the financial statement on the 
web) and attribute identification (i.e., finding the appropriate financial statement line 




4.9 Extensible Business Reporting Language 
EXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) is an open data standard for electronic 
financial reporting that fosters greater transparency into financial statements.  Using 
XBRL, organizations can capture financial information at any point in the business cycle 
(Coderre 2009).  XBRL has the ability to tag each element on a financial statement or 
report with descriptive information, which facilitates the comparison of financial 
information between organizations.  XBRL promises to improve accuracy of financial 
data, hasten its availability to capital markets, reduce the cost of providing financial data, 
facilitate paperless financial reporting, and provide more granular and comprehensive 
information (2009).  Moreover, XBRL will reduce the need to rekey and reformat 
financial data when preparing financial documentation such as printed financial 
statements, HTML documents for the organization's website or an electronic EDGAR 
filing (Zarowin and Harding 2000). 
One example of the analytic power of XBRL is FRAANK, an intelligent audit 
agent that converts an organization’s quarterly and annual financial reports into a XBRL 
format and retrieves this organization's most recent stock price and earnings per share.  
FRAANK uses this financial information to calculate various accounting ratios and Z-
score, which is a measure of bankruptcy risk.  Consequently FRAANK reduces the 
complexity, cost and latency of converting financial information into a computer 
understandable format (Bovee, Kogan et al. 2005).  Debreceny and Gray postulate that 
XBRL could be expanded to accommodate other types of financial reporting and 
speculates on an implementation time frame (Debreceny and Gray 2001).  Vasarhelyi and 




comprise a value chain, thereby facilitating end-to-end inter-organizational and value 
chain analysis (Vasarhelyi and Greenstein 2003).  This would enable corporate 
stakeholders to understand the economics of the whole value chain and the effects of a 
particular event or trend on it. 
Since the SEC mandated XBRL for regulatory filings, XBRL most likely will 
become the de facto standard in financial reporting.  In 2009, organizations with a public 
float greater than $5 billion began using XBRL for their financial reporting.  As of June 
15, 2011, all publicly traded companies were required to use XBRL for their financial 
reporting (Aguilar 2008). 
4.10 Workflow 
A workflow is an orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by 
systematic processes (Ko, Lee et al. 2009).  There have not been a lot of research articles 
focusing on the workflow within the context of Continuous Auditing.  However, 
workflow is used in commercial Continuous Auditing packages and intuitively seems to 
be a critical component for a Continuous Auditing system.  For example, when a unique 
audit exception is identified either from an alarm or by some other means, a formal 
workflow process could be defined to ensure the audit exception gets resolved in a timely 
manner.  At a minimum, a description of the audit exception the owner is responsible for 
resolving, a remediation plan, and a due date should be open for each audit exception.  
The remediation plan should be approved by the appropriate level of management, who 





4.11 Third Party Solutions 
Currently, there are several third-party Continuous Auditing software packages.  ACL, 
Approva, CaseWare IDEA, MetricStream, Oversight Technologies and Trintech are a 
few examples of commercial Continuous Auditing systems.  All of these products have 
predefined analytical methods for analyzing financial transactions, workflow 
management tools, sample business process control frameworks and ERP integration for 
extracting financial data.  Approva, MetricStream and Trintech also include robust 
dashboard reporting and sample risk management control frameworks (Kuhn Jr and 






This chapter describes the research model that was developed based on factors identified 
in the literature review. This research model is both confirmatory and exploratory 
research.  The research model is confirmatory because it builds on prior research to 
investigate whether the various proposed factors are useful in explaining relationships 
posited in the Continuous Monitoring domain space.  However, this research model at its 
core is exploratory.  It seeks to understand what are the most potentially fruitful 
Enterprise Risks and architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring 
implementation that would be used by management to monitor Enterprise Risks.   
5.2 Confirmatory Research 
Growing out of an extensive literature review related to Continuous Auditing the 
following two factors that may influence one’s opinion on the usefulness of Continuous 
Monitoring were investigated: 
RQ1: What individual and organizational characteristics are related to the 
likelihood of favorable opinions toward the adoption of Continuous Monitoring?  
H1: Employees of large auditing firms will be more resistant to 
Continuous Monitoring than the general population.  Research has 
indicated that a group’s resistance to a new system will increase if they 
perceive that it could reduce their power (Markus 1983).  Continuous 
Monitoring systems could jeopardize the big four accounting companies’ 
traditional business model.  
H2: Continuous Monitoring is more likely viewed favorably in companies 
with larger total revenue.  Research has indicated that a high-level of 
investment is a key prerequisite to successful Continuous Monitoring 
implementations (Fedorowicz 2008). 
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5.3 Exploratory Research 
Ultimately, this research model seeks to understand what is the most potentially fruitful 
domain space and technical architecture for an Enterprise Continuous Monitoring 
implementation.  By using qualitative methods, this research strives to gain expert 
consensus on the ideal Enterprise Risks and technical architecture. This complex and 
contextual decision-making process lends itself to qualitative research, which seeks to 
drive to consensus among an expert panel.  Specific research questions include: 
• RQ2: Which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to Continuous
Monitoring?
• RQ3: Which Continuous Monitoring architectural components are
perceived as most applicable to which types of Enterprise risks?
• RQ4: How does participation in an online Delphi process change the
initial viewpoints of the participants?
5.4 Methodology 
The research methodology was a snowballing Collaborating Design Delphi research 
study targeting professionals with experience in risk management, accounting, and/or 
Information Systems.  The traditional Delphi method is a structured, anonymous and 
multi-round survey process, where expert opinion is aggregated and disseminated to 
participants in subsequent rounds (Linstone 1975).  In Round one, a questionnaire was 
anonymously posed.  In subsequent rounds, the results from the previous round were 
aggregated and presented to the expert panel, which had the opportunity to revise their 
original answers in light of this new information.  Snowballing allowed the expert panel 
to suggest other experts to participate in the research study.  The researcher reviewed the 
qualifications of the suggested additions to the expert panel.  When they were consistent 
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with the desired profile of the research study, the researcher asked permission to use the 
name of the recommender in the invitation to the research study.  
The Delphi research method is well suited for this research problem.  The Delphi 
research method is designed to drive convergence between conflicting views. Moreover, 
the Delphi research method has a long history of being used for long-range technology 
predictions (Gordon and Helmer 1964).  Expert opinions have proven to be the best and, 
in some cases, the only source of available information, for forecasts in highly volatile 
and uncertain domain spaces like this one (Linstone 1975; Linstone and Turoff 2011) . 
Finally in general, this method overcomes the halo and bandwagon decision traps (Rowe, 
Wright et al. 1991) and produces more accurate forecasts than individuals on the average 
(Parenté, Anderson et al. 1984).   
Since Continuous Monitoring is a relatively new and niche concept, snowballing 
facilitated soliciting an adequate number of participants with sufficient qualifications to 
participate in this research.  Moreover, Collaborative Design has proven useful not only 
to the Continuous Monitoring domain space, but also other emerging areas of 
Information Systems research, where academic researchers have the objective of shaping 
practices as opposed to just describing them (Alles, Kogan et al. 2013). 
5.5 Participants 
In order to select suitable experts for the Delphi panel, the researcher’s personal and 
professional networks were scrutinized looking for individuals who have expertise in 
either risk management, accounting and/or Information Systems.  The ideal panel 
member had at least five years of professional experience and some knowledge of risk 
management, Information Systems or auditing.  Over 200 such individuals were 
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identified from the researcher’s professional network.  These individuals were sent an 
email with a link to participate in this research.  The researcher also promoted this study 
on Linkedin and hired Suvata, which is a target research firm, to attract additional 
participants.  The researcher’s dissertation committee had extensive personal and 
professional networks that were solicited as well.  Moreover, each participant had the 
opportunity to invite additional experts to participate during Round 1.  The minimally 
sufficient sample size for this Delphi was 50 total participants, of which at least 15 were 
required to be corporate risk managers. 
5.6 Procedures 
Questionnaires and procedures were submitted to the NJIT IRB prior to their use.  Before 
distributing questionnaires, pretests were carried out on a small number of subjects.  All 
selected participants received an email invitation from the researcher with a hyperlink to 
the Round 1 questionnaire.  This questionnaire had three sections: 1) A consent form, 2) 
Demographic Questions, and 3) Scenario Generation Questions, which allowed the 
participants to evaluate the importance of each risk and the feasibility of continuously 
monitoring it.  All participants that completed this questionnaire were invited via an 
email to participate in subsequent rounds.   
Round 2 presented three risk scenarios and let participants evaluate the 
desirability and feasibility of the proposed measures and opine on how useful Continuous 
Monitoring would be to monitoring these risk scenarios.  Round 3 presented the key 
assumptions collected in Round 2 and allowed participants to change their Round 2 
answers in light of these assumptions.  Each round lasted approximately one to two 
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months.  This research study took approximately 6 months.  The below figure 
summarizes the process. 
Figure 5.1 Summary of research method. 
Great care was taken to ensure that this research study would not have any 
adverse effects on its participants.  Prior to conducting this research study, the researcher, 
who is a NJIT Ph.D. student, completed the online training course in the protection of 
human subjects offered by the US Department of Health and Human Services.  Initial 
questions and consent forms were reviewed and edited by his Ph.D. committee. 
Moreover, participation in the survey is completely optional and is targeted to working 
professionals over the age of 21.  Finally, participants could choose to terminate their 
involvement in this research study at any time for any reason.  
Reasonable safeguards were in place to protect the anonymity of the participants. 
Numerical IDs were assigned to participants’ survey results.  The numerical ID mapping 
to the participant’s name remain strictly confidential.  This key as well as all the raw 















protected and encrypted computer.  Participants were informed that the responses might 
be summarized and, possibly, disseminated to the professional community.  However, the 
researcher took special care to prevent responses from being traced back to individual 
participants.  Only participants that granted explicit permission could have their name 
listed in subsequent publications.   
Before being distributed to participants all questions were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  All of the IRB suggested modifications were 
incorporated.  Then, the survey questions were drafted and piloted with several test 
participants.  The pilot was designed to ensure that questions were understandable and 
clear.   
5.7 Measurement and Analysis 
For Research Question 1, attitudes towards Continuous Monitoring were grouped into 
three buckets 1) those who have worked for a Big 4 auditing firm. 2) those that are 
currently working for the largest companies in terms of revenue and do not work at a Big 
4 auditing firm 3) those that are currently working for the smallest companies.  An 
ANOVA was used to determine if there is a statistical difference for the perceived 
usefulness of a Continuous Monitoring system among these groups.   
For Research Question 2, the ideal Enterprise Risk for Continuous Monitoring 
techniques would have a continuous stream of analyzable electronic data, have a domain 
space that does not overly rely on human judgment nor contain competing objectives, 
have a predictive model that is cheap to construct and improves the accuracy, reliability, 
and/or timeliness of risk predictions over what is currently available via expert decision-




were calculated for Round 2’s questions.  The second part of each question was 
qualitatively analyzed to identify the key assumption themes that were presented in 
subsequent rounds of the Delphi.  In Round 3, the quantitative and qualitative summary 
of each question was provided for each of the Likert scale questions.  Specifically the 
mean and standard deviation of the first part of each question as well as a summary of the 
key assumption themes from the second part were presented.  In light of this new 
information, the participants were asked to evaluate the assumptions that underlay 
different answers (using a Likert scale and open-ended comments) and then to reevaluate 
their answers to the first part of each question (i.e., the Likert scale question) for the same 
risk scenarios.  The Enterprise Risks were ranked by how much they lend themselves to 
Continuous Monitoring techniques.  These questions were structured such that risks with 
higher aggregate average Likert scores were more amenable to Continuous Monitoring 
techniques than those with lower average Likert scores.  To calculate the overall 
auspiciousness for using Continuous Monitoring for a specific risk scenario, all of its 
Likert- scale questions were averaged together.  The Enterprise Risk that on average had 
the highest Likert score was deemed the best Enterprise Risk for Continuous Monitoring. 
For Research Question 3, participants were asked to identify the architectural 
components that would form the basis of a Continuous Monitoring System for a 
particular Enterprise Risk.  A Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine whether there 
were differences among the usage of architectural components across different Enterprise 
Risks.  For each Enterprise Risk, participants were asked to suggest other architectural 
components that were not listed.  These suggestions were qualitatively analyzed to assess 




After the final round, the questions’ means and standard deviations were 
compared between Rounds 2 and 3.  If the Delphi were driving towards consensus, the 
standard deviations would be reduced in Round 3.  For Research Question 4, the answers 
to the pre-test and post-test Continuous Monitoring perceived business value question 
were compared with a t-test to see if the study materially influenced the participant’s 
opinions on Continuous Monitoring.  Finally, data analysis was performed to determine 
whether there were any latent relationships between the demographic information and the 







6.1 Round 1 
In Round 1, 217 potential participants that were selected from the researcher’s 
professional network received an email invitation to participate in this research study.  
The Round 1 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com and was open from June 30th 
2014 to August 11th 2014.  The complete survey is listed in Appendix A. 
To promote this research study all potential participants were allowed to 
recommend additional participants regardless of whether or not they actually participated 
in the research study.  Public invitations were also posted on a couple of LinkedIn 
groups: Continuous Controls Monitoring and Continuous Audit.  Finally Survata, which 
is a targeted survey firm, was retained to identify and solicit additional participants.   
At the end of Round 1, there were 184 fully completed responses.  There were an 
additional 65 surveys that were started, but not completed, and two surveys where the 
respondents answered, “I don’t know” to every question.  These surveys were 
disregarded from all subsequent data analysis.  For the completed surveys, respondents 
had an average of 13 years of I.T. experience, and six years of risk management and 
internal/external audit experience. 29 (16% of total) were C-Level executives (e.g., 
CEOs, CTOs CIOs, etc.), 30 (16% of the total) were senior managers, 72 (39% of the 
total) were middle management, and the other 53 (28 % of the total) were either in 




Table  6.1 Respondent’s Position Distribution 
Position Count % 
C-Level Executive  29 16% 
Senior Management 30 16% 
Supervisor / Middle Management 72 39% 
Other 34 18% 
Not Employed 19 10% 
Total 184 100% 
 
There were 119 respondents (65% of the total) that identified themselves as male, 
63 (34% of the total) respondents that identified themselves as female and 2 respondents 
that preferred not to identify their gender.  There were 95 respondents, 52% of the total 
that completed their bachelor’s degree, 56 respondents (30% of the total) that completed 
their master’s degree, and 3 respondents (2% of the total) completed their doctorate.  The 
Table 6.2 has the complete distribution. 
Table  6.2 Respondent’s Education Distribution 
Highest Education Count % 
High School 28 15% 
Bachelors 95 52% 
Masters 56 30% 
Doctorate 3 2% 
None of the above 2 1% 
Total 184 100% 
 
Age was pretty evenly distributed between the ages of 21 and 64. 38 (21% of 
total) respondents stated they were between 21 and 34 years old, 43 (23% of total) were 
between the ages of 35 and 44 years old, 54 (29% of total) were between 45 and 54 years 
old, and 42 (23% of total) were between 55 and 64 years old.  There were only 7 (4% of 




“75 years or older” or the “Prefer not to answer” categories.  The Table 6.3 has the 
complete distribution. 
Table  6.3 Respondent’s Age Distribution 
Age Group Count % 
21-34 years old 38 21% 
35-44 years old 43 23% 
45-54 years old 54 29% 
55-64 years old 42 23% 
65-74 years old 7 4% 
Total 184 100% 
 
The respondents worked in many different industries. 32% of the respondents 
selected “Other” for their industry.  Moreover, the ten industries listed on the survey each 
had three or more respondents.  Manufacturing and Banking/Finance had the most entries 
with 23 each, which was 12% of the total.  Transportation had the fewest respondents 
with three.  Table 6.4 has the complete distribution.  Ten respondents worked at a Big 4 
accounting firm, while 174 have not.  Overall, the response rate from Big 4 accounting 
companies was surprisingly low relative to other industries.  Some respondents that 
worked for a Big 4 accounting firm commented that their firm had a stated policy 




Table  6.4 Respondent’s Position Distribution 
Industry Count % 
Other 59 32% 
Manufacturing 23 12% 
Banking/Finance 23 12% 
Not Currently Employed 16 9% 
Government 11 6% 
Education 10 5% 
Communications 10 5% 
Healthcare 10 5% 
Insurance 9 5% 
Retail 6 3% 
Hospitality 5 3% 
Transportation 3 2% 
Total 184 100% 
 
The respondents tended to work in larger companies.  “Over a billion”, which was 
both the largest revenue category and also the most frequently selected category on the 
survey, had 47 respondents (26% of the total).  The other five revenue levels all had at 
least ten respondents each. 27 respondents (15% of the total) did not know their 
company’s revenue size.  The Table 6.5 has the complete distribution. 
Table  6.5 Respondent’s Company Size Distribution 
Company Size Count % 
Under $1M 22 12% 
Between $1 and $10 Million 23 13% 
Between $10 and $100 Million 36 20% 
Between $100 and $500 Million 19 10% 
Between $500 Million and $1 Billion 10 5% 
Over $1 Billion 47 26% 
Not sure / Don't know 27 15% 





6.1.1  Attitudes Towards Continuous Monitoring 
Overall, the respondents had a very positive view of Continuous Monitoring.  There were 
73 respondents (39% of the total) that believed Continuous Monitoring is “Very Likely” 
to provide material business value and 83 respondents (44% of the total) believe 
Continuous Monitoring is “Likely” to have material business value.  Conversely only two 
respondents (1% of the total) believed that Continuous Monitoring was unlikely to 
provide material business value.  Table 6.6 has the complete distribution. 
Table  6.6 Respondent’s Belief that Continuous Monitoring Could Add Value 
Company Size Count % 
Very likely 73 40% 
Likely 83 45% 
Neutral 26 14% 
Unlikely 0 0% 
Very unlikely 2 1% 
Total 184 100% 
 
Questions 14 and 15 determine an Enterprise Risk’s feasibility and desirability 
respectively.  The “Don’t know” answers were filtered out for both questions and their 
feasibility and desirability scores were averaged together.  In aggregate, the top three 
Enterprise Risks that the participants believed lend themselves to a Continuous 
Monitoring system are (1) Computer Crime (2) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk (3) 
Damage to Brand and Reputation.  The bottom three risks were Legal, Regulatory and 




Table  6.7 Average Ranking by Enterprise Risks 
Average Ranking by Enterprise 




Computer Crime 1.83 2.14 1.98 
Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk 2.02 2.15 2.08 
Damage to brand/reputation 2.05 2.21 2.13 
External Business interruption 2.07 2.24 2.15 
Surprise Competitive Threats 2.02 2.29 2.16 
Economic Volatility 2.10 2.33 2.21 
Internal Business interruption 2.09 2.35 2.22 
Legal Risks 2.13 2.36 2.24 
Regulatory 2.13 2.38 2.26 
Commodity Price Risk 2.21 2.37 2.29 
*Scale: 1-Very Desirable; 2-Desirable; 3-Possibly 
Desirable; 4-Undesirable; 5-Very Undesirable   
**Scale: 1-Very Feasible; 2-
Feasible; 3-Possibly Feasible;  
4-Unfeasible; 5-Very Unfeasible 
 
6.1.2 RQ1: Adoption Characteristics 
Research Question 1 attempts to determine the individual and organizational 
characteristics related to favorable opinions about Continuous Monitoring.  Based on the 
literature review, the size and type of a company were hypothesized to influence the 
perception of Continuous Monitoring.  Other things being equal, working at a Big 4 audit 
firm was hypothesized to lead to a more unfavorable perception of Continuous 
Monitoring while working at another large company was hypothesized to lead to a more 
favorable perception.  Prior research has indicated that Continuous Monitoring systems 
could jeopardize the Big four accounting companies’ traditional business model, which 
would make them selfishly more cynical of this technology, and that a high-level of 
investment required for Continuous Monitoring implementations, would make this 
technology more appealing to large companies that can afford it compared to small 




Question 13 is the dependent variable.  It asked, “To what extent do you believe 
that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to provide material business value to 
today’s companies?”  The complete distribution of answer choices was shown above in 
Table 6.6.  The Likert score scale was  
0 – Don’t Know (not used in the analysis).  
1 – Very Unlikely 
2 – Unlikely 
3 – Neutral 
4 – Likely 
5 - Very Likely 
 
“Don't know” responses were dropped from the mean and standard deviation 
calculations, because this analysis focused only on participants that were confident in 
their answers, which is standard protocol for this type of analysis.  The Ryan-Joiner 
normality test confirms that this variable is normally distributed at an α = 0.05 (p=0.10).  
However, this question is substantially skewed toward the positive end.  Dropping “0-
Don’t Know” responses from the sample, the sample’s mean is 4.22 and its standard 
deviation is 0.77. 
The independent variables are Question 10 and Question 11.  Question 10 asked, 
“Are you employed by PWC, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young and/or KPMG?” (i.e., 
the Big 4 Accounting firms).  The answer choices were “Yes” and “No”.  Question 11 
asked, “How large is your current employer in terms of Total Annual Revenue?” The 




Under $1 Million 
> $1 Million and <= $10 Million 
> $10 Million and <= $100 Million 
> $100 Million <= $500 Million 
> $500 Million <= $1 Billion 
Over $1 Billion 
Not sure / Don't know 
 
The “I Don’t know” responses for Questions 11 and 13 were dropped.  Table 6.8 shows 
the Likert score distribution across these categories. 















Big 4 10% 10% 30% 50% 10% 10 
Not Big 4 1% 14% 45% 40% 1% 157 
$1B or more 2% 9% 38% 51% 2% 45 
Under $1B 0% 17% 49% 34% 0% 102 
 
The means are in the hypothesized order: Big 4 the lowest (i.e., 4.10) and “1B or more” 
the highest (4.36).  See the below figure. 
 





The Point Biserial Correlation Coefficient for revenue size is 0.11, which means 
there is a slight positive correlation between revenue size and increased Likert score for 
perceived usefulness of Continuous Monitoring.  The Point Biserial Correlation 
Coefficient for a Big 4 audit firm is -0.04, which means there is a very small negative 
correlation between working at a big audit firm and the perceived usefulness of 
Continuous Monitoring.  Table 6.9 has the summary statistics for these groups.   
Table  6.9 RQ1 Summary Statistics  
 N Mean Stdev 
Big 4 10 4.10 1.29 
Not Big 4 147 4.23 0.74 
$1B or more 45 4.36 0.83 
Under $1B 102 4.18 0.70 
All 157 4.22 0.78 
 
Even though the means are in the hypothesized order, this result was not 
statistically significant.  A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is a statistical 
method that analyzes variations in means among disparate groups, was calculated for the 
three groups: 1) “Companies $1 Billion or more in Revenue”, 2) “Companies less than a 
3) $1 Billion in revenue”, and “Big 4 Accounting firms”, which by their nature are over 
$1 Billion in revenue.  The analysis was not significant at an α = 0.05 (p = .39), when 
using the single question indicator of attitude toward Continuous Monitoring. 
6.1.3 Constructing a Desirability Index 
In order to construct an alternative measure of business value, a Factor analysis, which is 
a statistical method that examines correlations among observed variables to extract a few 
latent variables, was run to create a Desirability index.  Question 15 solicited opinions on 




literature review.  The following sample set manipulations where made to clean the data 
and consolidate categories that had sparse data points: 
• Respondents that answered, “I don’t know” to any Desirability or 
Feasibility question were dropped from the sample.  
• Respondents that answered “None of the above” to Question 8 were 
dropped because of their small sample sizes.  Those that answered 
“Doctorate” where grouped into “Masters+.” 
• Respondents that answered, “Prefer not to answer” to Question 7, which 
dealt with Gender, were dropped, because of its small sample size.   
• Question 9, which was the Industry question, responses that were either 
“Retail”, “Hospitality”, or “Transportation” were recoded as “Other”. 
• Question 5 responses, which captured the amount of Risk Management, 
Information Systems, and Audit Experience the respondents had, were 
collapsed into the following categories “None”, “<= 5”,  “>5 and <= 10” 
“>10 and <=20”, “20+” years. 
 
In total, 17 respondents were removed from the sample and 12 answers to Question 9 
were recoded as “Other”.  Table 6.10 summarizes the resulting distribution. 
Table 6.10 Desirability Distribution by Likert Scale 
Enterprise Risk 1 2 3 4 5 
15.a: Economic Volatility 30% 38% 27% 5% 0% 
15.b: Regulatory 31% 35% 27% 5% 1% 
15.c: Competitive Threats 37% 37% 20% 5% 1% 
15.d: Market 36% 35% 25% 4% 1% 
15.e: Reputation 34% 37% 22% 7% 1% 
15.f: Legal 37% 26% 28% 8% 1% 
15.g: External Interruption 37% 33% 23% 4% 2% 
15.h: Internal interruption 32% 38% 22% 5% 2% 
15.i: Commodity 28% 37% 27% 7% 1% 
15.j: Computer Crime 48% 32% 16% 3% 2% 
1-Very Desirable; 2-Desirable; 3-Possibly Desirable; 4-Undesirable; 5-Very Undesirable 
 
The Factor analysis was run on this same sample set of 167 respondents.  The one 
variable Factor analysis explained 67% of the variance and measures the Desirability of 




loading factors, which demonstrate a strong correlation with Question 15’s desirability 
variables and measures the desirability of using Continuous Monitoring across this set of 
Enterprise Risks. 
Table  6.11 Loading Factors from Factor Analysis 
Variable Loading 
Factors 
Economic Volatility  0.72 
Regulatory  0.79 
Competitive Threats 0.84 
Market 0.77 
Reputation  0.78 
Legal  0.85 
External Interruption  0.85 
Internal Interruption  0.82 
Commodity  0.85 
Computer Crime 0.83 
 
This desirability index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95, which means that it is strongly 
internally consistent.  Its mean is 2.47 and standard deviation is 0.95.   
A one way ANOVA was individually run between the demographic variables and 
Desirability Index.  No variables were significant at α = 0.05.  However, Years of Audit 
Experience was significant at α = 0.10.  Generally speaking, the more years of audit 
experience the participant had the more desirable they thought Continuous Monitoring 
would be.  Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Years of Risk 
Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role, Industry, Gender and Age variables 




Table  6.12 Desirability Index ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values 
Variable P-Value R-Square 
Years of Auditing Experience** 0.06 5.34 
Education 0.19 2.04 
Years of Risk Management Experience 0.22 3.49 
Role 0.38 2.56 
Age 0.42 2.36 
Revenue 0.44 3.55 
Industry 0.45 4.75 
Years of Information Management Experience 0.51 2.00 
Gender 0.87 0.02 
Big 4 0.95 0.00 
**Signification at α = 0.10 
 
6.1.4 Constructing a Feasibility Index 
In order to construct an alternative measure of business value, a Factor analysis was run 
on the feasibility variables from Questions 16.  Question 16 solicited opinions on how 
feasible Continuous Monitoring would be for the Enterprise Risk identified in the 
literature review.  Table 6.13 summarizes this distribution. 
Table6.13 Feasibility Distribution by Likert Scale 
Enterprise Risk 1 2 3 4 5 
16.a: Economic Volatility 25% 37% 31% 8% 0% 
16.b: Regulatory 23% 38% 29% 10% 0% 
16.c: Competitive Threats 25% 34% 34% 7% 1% 
15.i: Commodity Price 25% 31% 33% 10% 1% 
15.j: Computer Crime 32% 30% 34% 4% 0% 
15.g: External interruption 27% 23% 41% 8% 1% 
15.h: Internal Business 24% 29% 37% 9% 1% 
15.f: Legal 24% 28% 35% 11% 1% 
15.d: Market 26% 25% 44% 5% 1% 
15.e: Reputation 28% 32% 35% 5% 0% 
1-Very Feasible; 2-Feasible; 3-Possibly Feasible; 4-Unfeasible; 5-Very Unfeasible 
 
The Factor analysis was run on the same sample set of 167 respondents described 
in Subsection 6.1.3.  The one variable Factor analysis explained 41% of the variance. 




16’s feasibility variables and measures the feasibility of using Continuous Monitoring 
across this set of Enterprise Risks. 




Economic Volatility  0.63 
Regulatory  0.66 
Competitive Threats 0.70 
Market 0.55 
Reputation  0.59 
Legal  0.60 
External Interruption  0.66 
Internal Interruption  0.72 
Commodity Risk  0.64 
Computer Crime 0.61 
 
This feasibility index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84, which implies that it has good 
internal consistency.  Its mean is 3.55 and standard deviation is 0.95 
A one way ANOVA was run between the demographic variables and Feasibility 
Index.  Years of Audit was significant at α = 0.05 and Years of Risk Management 
Experience was significant at α = 0.10.  Generally speaking, the more years of audit 
and/or risk management experience, the more feasible the participant thought Continuous 
Monitoring would be.  Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education, 
Revenue, Role, Industry, Gender and Age variables were not significant at an α = 0.10. 
Big 4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role, 




Table  6.15 Feasibility Index ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values 
Variable P-Value R-Square 
Years of Auditing Experience* 0.00 11.61 
Years of Risk Management Experience** 0.08 5.04 
Education 0.38 1.16 
Revenue 0.42 3.64 
Big 4 0.46 0.33 
Years of Information Management Experience 0.48 2.13 
Gender 0.85 0.02 
Role 0.90 0.64 
Age 0.91 6.10 
Industry 0.93 1.88 
   * Significant at α = 0.05 
 ** Significant at α = 0.10 
 
6.1.5 Exploratory Data Analysis 
Round 1’s data was also examined to determine whether there are any latent relationships 
that were not explicitly indicated by the literature review.  A one way ANOVA was run 
on the same sample set of 167 respondents described in Subsection 6.1.3.  The ANOVA 
individually compared demographic variables and Question 13 that measures business 
value.  Question 13 is “To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the 
potential to provide material business value to today’s companies?”  Years of Auditing 
Experience and Years of Risk Management Experience were significant at α = 0.05.  Big 
4, Years of Information Management Experience, Education, Revenue, Role, Industry, 




Table  6.16 Perceived Business Value ANOVA P-Value and R Square Values 
Variable P-Value R-Square 
Years of Auditing Experience* 0.01 8.27 
Years of Risk Management Experience* 0.02 6.72 
Big 4 0.15 1.24 
Years of Information Management Experience 0.17 3.88 
Education 0.69 0.45 
Revenue 0.75 2.12 
Role 0.88 0.72 
Industry 0.89 2.22 
Gender 0.96 0.00 
Age 0.98 0.24 
 * Significant at α = 0.05 
 
For both Risk Management and Auditing, having more than five years of 
experience seems to affect the perceived business value for Continuous Monitoring.  
Participants that had less than five years’ experience in these respective areas tended to 
have worse perception of Continuous Monitoring value proposition than their more 
experienced counterparts did.  For Risk Management five to ten years of experience had 
the highest perceived value of Continuous Monitoring.  The perception decreases in the 
ten to 20 year range, and fell again in the 20+ year range.  Similarly, for Auditing, the 
five to ten years of experience had the highest perceived value of Continuous Monitoring 
and the perception dipped slightly with ten to 20 years of experience.  However, for 





Table  6.17 Mean Perceived Business Value by Years of Experience 











None 2.0 57 1.9 57 
<=5 1.8 42 1.9 53 
>5 & <=10 1.5 36 1.5 33 
>10 & <=20 1.6 26 1.6 15 
20+ 1.8 6 1.3 9 
Total 1.8 167 1.8 167 
Scale:1-Very Likely, 2-Likely, 3-Neutral, 4-Unlikely, 5-Very Unlikely 
 
Performing a t-test on these variables when they are bisected into two groups: 
“less than or equal to five years of experience” and “greater than five years of 
experience”, yields significant results at α = 0.05   For Risk Management and Auditing 
experience, the t-test yields a p-value = .00.  This implies that having more experience in 
either Risk Management and/or Auditing significantly affects the perceived business 
value of Continuous Monitoring.  It appears that the more experience in these areas, the 
higher the perceived value of Continuous Monitoring.   
6.1.6 Differences between Solicitation Methods 
There were two methods used to solicit participants: 1) the researcher’s professional 
network and 2) Survata, which is a targeted research firm.  For Round 1 there were 150 
participants in the Survata pool and 17 participants in the researcher’s pool.  They were 
compared along several dimensions to determine whether there were statistical 
differences between the solicitation methods.  Specifically, these pools were compared 
using a one-way ANOVA along the following dimensions: perceived value of 
Continuous Monitoring (Question 13), company revenue size (Question 11), role 




Between the pools, education was the only dimension with a statistical difference at an α 
= 0.05 (see below table).   
Table  6.18 Mean Business Value by years of Risk Management and Audit Experience 





Q8: Education* 2.14 2.59 0.01 
Q11: Company Revenue 3.26 3.12 0.80 
Q12: Role 1.19 1.18 0.95 
Q13: Perceived Business Value Proposition 1.59 1.77 0.33 
* Significant at α = 0.05 
 
Table 6.19 contains the Likert score to answer choice mapping by question.  











0 None of the above Not sure Not Employed / Other Very likely 
1 High School Under $1M Middle Manger Likely 
2 Bachelors $1 - $10 Mil Senior Manager Neutral 
3 Masters+ $10 - $100 Mil Executive Unlikely 
4  $100 - $500 Mil  Very unlikely 
5  $500 Mil - $1 Bil   
6  Over $1 Bil   
 
6.1.7 Building Round 2’s Scenarios 
Question 16 was qualitatively analyzed for potential scenarios for Round 2.   The 
following Enterprise Risk Taxonomy was used 
• Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another major financial crisis (e.g., 
Mortgage default) and/or downturn. Recent examples include weakness in 
the Eurozone, projected slowed economic growth forecast in India and 
China, persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated worldwide 
unemployment rate, reoccurring financial crisis, failure of major countries 
to pay their debt. 
• Regulatory pressure and/or changes in regulatory environment: Basel III, 
SOX, Dodd-Frank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices legislation, local 
privacy, investigation by government agency or regulatory body & laws 




• Surprise Competitive Threats: New and, perhaps better, competitors 
and/or products in the marketplace change in consumer trends and 
technological advancements (i.e., product obsolesces), increased global 
competitive pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such as price wars), 
mergers and acquisitions.  
• Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk: The risk that borrows will default on 
their commitments. The risk that an investor will experience losses as 
result of participating in financial markets.  The risk of loss resulting from 
being unable to trade a security or asset quickly. 
• Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls, regulatory challenges (e.g., 
JP Morgan Chase), involvement in a corporate or personal scandal (e.g., 
Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or product (e.g., Blackberry), 
unable to meet demand for successful product, being flamed on social 
media.  
• Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits. 
• External Business interruption: Infrastructure failures (e.g., electricity and 
telecommunication network failures), financial market failures (closing of 
key markets), loss of computer infrastructure, transportation strikes, 
criminal attacks, or embargos.  
• Internal Business interruption: For example strike or slowdown, accidents, 
fraud, workplace violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear power plant 
explosion of materials or fires).  
• Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas, shortages that lead to price 
run-ups.  
• Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus and malicious code, 
proprietary or customer information can be stolen via hacking or internal 
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards); malicious software can disrupt 
operations of essential services such as security, defense, power plants, as 
well as banking, commerce, etc. 
 
The qualitative analysis revealed that 58 respondents did not provide business 
scenarios.  The computer crime category had the largest number of suggested scenarios.  
32 respondents suggested a specific Computer Crime scenario (e.g., hacking, IP theft, 
etc.) as the most auspicious area for a Continuous Monitoring system.  Most suggested 
scenarios dealing with protecting customer and credit card data from hackers.  Both the 
2014 Target and 2012 Sony intrusions were suggested as possible scenarios.  Other more 




security defense area such as a nuclear power plant, detecting phishing schemes on social 
media sites and monitoring employee access patterns to prevent data theft.  
Several suggested more traditional Continuous Monitoring Scenarios in the areas 
of Operations, Fraud Detection and Compliance, which is where Continuous Monitoring 
has been routinely used for some time now.  Some example scenarios include monitoring 
for operational processes for failure, fraud, audit exceptions, business interruptions and 
long tailed risk. However, there were also some novel suggestions. Two respondents 
suggested using Continuous Monitoring to monitor social media to detect potential 
reputational risks and/or looming public relations crises.  Another two respondents 
suggested using Continuous Monitoring to monitor the speed of operational and 
production processes.  Finally, another two respondents suggested using Continuous 
Monitoring in the health care field.  One suggested monitoring medical records for 
potential early warning signs of a serious medical condition.  The other suggested using 
Continuous Monitoring to ensure a hospital’s compliance with governmental mandates 
around health care.  These novel scenarios could be the basis of future research in 




Table  6.20 Qualitative Categorization of Scenario Generation Question  
Category N % 
No Scenario Provided 58 31.52% 
Computer Crime* 32 17.39% 
Operations** 24 13.04% 
Other 20 10.87% 
Economic Volatility* 15 8.15% 
Internal Fraud/Thief** 11 5.98% 
External Business interruption* 8 4.35% 
Surprise Competitive Threats* 7 3.80% 
Regulatory* 3 1.63% 
Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk* 2 1.09% 
Legal Risks* 1 0.54% 
Damage to brand/reputation* 1 0.54% 
Compliance** 1 0.54% 
Internal Business interruption* 1 0.54% 
Commodity Price Risk* 0 0% 
Total 184 100.00% 
Enterprise Risks* 
Traditional Continuous Monitoring Risk** 
 
Computer Crime, Economic Volatility, and Surprise Competitive Threat were 
chosen to be studied in Round 2.  The Harvard Business Case repository was searched for 
representative business cases that fit these Enterprise Risks.  After a thorough review, the 
following cases were selected:  Sony’s 2012 Cyber Intrusion for Computer Crime, Bear 
Stearns’ Implosion for Market Risk, and RIM’s loss of Competitive Advantage for 
Damage to brand and/or reputation.  These cases were summarized and presented in 




6.2 Round 2 
The 188 respondents that completed Round 1 were sent an email invitation to the Round 
2 survey.  The Round 2 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com and was open from 
September 29, 2014 to November 10, 2014.  Round 2 had 81 respondents that completed 
the entire survey.  The dropout rate between Round 1 and Round 2 was 57%.  Round 2 
presented examples of the top three Enterprise Risks identified in Round 1.  The Sony 
scenario dealt with computer crime. The Bear Stearns scenario dealt with operational 
risk. The RIM scenario dealt with strategic risk.  The complete survey is listed in 
Appendix B.   
6.2.1 RQ2: Auspicious Enterprise Risks 
Research Question 2 seeks to determine which Enterprise Risks are most amenable to 
Continuous Monitoring.  Likert-type questions were constructed to measure the detailed 
factors that could lead to a successful Continuous Monitoring system.  Six factors were 
identified based upon the literature review:  
1. Cost of human judgment, 
2. Cost of building a predictive model, 
3. Availability of digital data, 
4. Proficiency of human judgment to detect risk, 
5. The probability a predictive model can be built and, 
6. The performance of the best predictive model compared to expert human 
judgment.  
 
The Likert scale was constructed such that a higher Likert score on a question indicated a 
more advantageous scenario for Continuous Monitoring.  The same Likert questions were 




Table 6.21 Likert Scale by Question 

































Judgment / I 
don’t know 
None or 
very little of 
the data 
needed is in 
a digital 
form 
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don’t know 
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Higher scores are more advantageous to Continuous Monitoring 
 






Table 6.22 Digital Data Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 0% 25% 16% 44% 15% 237 13 
Bear Stearns 7% 39% 11% 38% 5% 180 20 
Blackberry 15% 26% 9% 34% 15% 163 28 
 Total 7% 30% 13% 39% 12% 580 61 
 
Table 6.23 Cost Human Judgment Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 0% 7% 39% 40% 13% 241 14 
Bear Stearns 3% 7% 39% 44% 7% 203 22 
Blackberry 2% 15% 49% 26% 8% 171 28 
 Total 2% 9% 42% 37% 9% 615 64 
 
Table 6.24 Cost Predictive Model Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 7% 59% 30% 4% 0% 164 10 
Bear Stearns 9% 42% 39% 8% 2% 165 15 
Blackberry 13% 30% 41% 13% 4% 143 27 
 Total 9% 45% 36% 8% 2% 472 52 
 
Table 6.25 Human Judgment Detect Risk Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 7% 27% 39% 21% 6% 207 10 
Bear Stearns 14% 22% 28% 25% 12% 195 16 
Blackberry 15% 27% 28% 23% 7% 168 21 
 Total 12% 25% 32% 23% 8% 570 47 
 
Table 6.26 Predictive Model Can be Built Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 1% 12% 28% 46% 13% 243 13 
Bear Stearns 8% 23% 28% 27% 14% 202 17 
Blackberry 13% 20% 22% 33% 11% 167 27 





Table 6.27 Model compared to Human Judgment Distribution by Likert Scale 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Vote 
# of No 
Judgments 
Sony 3% 10% 24% 49% 14% 253 11 
Bear Stearns 8% 11% 32% 33% 16% 213 18 
Blackberry 14% 21% 32% 23% 9% 163 25 
Total 8% 14% 29% 36% 13% 629 54 
 
The “Ryan-Joiner” Normality Test concluded that the variables are normally 
distributed at an α = 0.05 (p=0.07).  In aggregate, the results of Round 2 mirrored Round 
1.  Averaging each case’s six question Likert score, respondents in Round 2 ranked Sony 
as the most advantageous Continuous Monitoring scenario with a mean Likert score of 
3.24 out of 5, which was followed by Bear Stearns with a mean Likert score of 3.06 out 
of 5, while RIM was viewed as the least advantageous scenario with a mean Likert score 
of 2.95 out of 5 (see below table).  
Table  6.28 Mean Likert Scaled Values by Question 
Factors Sony 
Bear 
Stearns RIM Total 
Cost Human Judgment 3.60 3.44 3.23 3.44 
Cost Predictive Model 2.31 2.50 2.65 2.47 
Digital Data 3.49 2.95 3.08 3.19 
Human Judgment Detect Risk 2.92 3.00 2.80 2.91 
Predictive Model Can be Built 3.57 3.16 3.09 3.29 
Predictive Model compared to Human  3.61 3.38 2.91 3.33 
Mean Likert Score 3.24 3.06 2.95 3.10 
“No Judgment” responses were excluded from mean calculations 
 
A one-way ANOVA was calculated between the three scenarios across all six 
factors.  The variance between scenarios was significant at an α = 0.05 (p = .00).  
Therefore, participants viewed some scenarios as more advantageous to Continuous 
Monitoring than other scenarios.  Specifically, the Sony scenario that dealt with risk of 




the operational and strategic risks illustrated by the Bear Stearns and RIM scenario 
respectively.  This ranking is consistent with the ranking identified in Round 1 (see 
Subsection 6.1.7). 
6.2.2 RQ3: Requisite Architectural Components 
Research Question 3 seeks to determine the requisite Continuous Monitoring 
architectural components and determine the ones that are most applicable to an Enterprise 
Risk.  In questions 9, 16 and 23 of Round 2 participants were asked to select all the 
components that they believed would be in a Continuous Monitoring system for the Sony, 
Bear Stern, and RIM scenarios respectively.  Generally speaking, the participants were 
roughly evenly divided on whether or not a component was needed for each scenario.  
Table 6.29 summarizes the percentage of participants that selected each component 
across the three scenarios. 










Bear Stearns 49% 53% 54% 49% 43% 
RIM 58% 47% 46% 42% 32% 
Sony 48% 49% 52% 63% 49% 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis test was run on the five components; Analytic Functions, Dashboard 
Reporting, Data Warehouse, and Digital Agents and Workflows, which were described in 
Chapter 4.  This test indicated that Digital Agents and Workflows were used differently 
across the three business scenarios.  Moreover, there was no usage difference among the 
other three components (i.e., Analytical Functions, Dashboard Reporting and Data 
















Digital Agents* 1 0 0 0.03 
Workflows** 0 0 0 0.08 
Analytical Functions 0 0 1 0.39 
Data Warehouse 1 1 0 0.53 
Dashboard Reporting 0 1 0 0.73 
Scale 1 = Use the Component, 0 = Don’t use the Component  
  * Significant at α = 0.05 
** Significant at α = 0.10 
 
Participants were also asked to suggest other potential architectural components 
for each business scenario.  A qualitative review of their responses uncovered no new 
architectural components, which offers strong evidence that the literature review 
identified the main architectural components for a Continuous Monitoring system. 
6.3 Round 3 
Research Question 4 measures how participation in this research study changes the initial 
viewpoints of the participants.  The Round 3 survey was hosted by Surveymonkey.com 
and was open from January 24, 2015 to February 7, 2015.  Round 3 had 59 respondents 
that completed the entire survey.  The between round dropout rate was 27%.  The 
complete set of questions is listed in Appendix C.  On balance participants feel they 
obtained useful information from this research study (i.e., the mean Likert score for 
Question 21 was 2.6); this was a high quality research study (i.e., the mean Likert score 
for Question 24 was 4.2); and its results have the potential to be important (i.e., the mean 




6.3.1 RQ4: Research Study Changes Viewpoints 
Research Question 4 measures how participation in this research study changes the initial 
viewpoints of the participants.  In Round 1 and 3, the participants were asked, “To what 
extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to provide material 
business value to today’s companies?”  The Likert score scale was  
5 - Very Likely 
4 – Likely 
3 – Neutral 
2 – Unlikely 
1 – Very Unlikely 
 
Table 6.31 has the distribution of responses to these questions.  Those that answered, “I 
don’t know” were excluded from this analysis. 
Table  6.31 Continuous Monitoring Value Proposition Distribution Round 1 and 3 
Responses 
Round 1 Round 3 
# % # % 
Very likely 73 40% 17 29% 
Likely 83 45% 34 58% 
Neutral 26 14% 4 7% 
Unlikely 0 0% 3 5% 
Very unlikely 2 1% 1 2% 
Total 184 100% 59 100% 
 
For this question, the mean Likert response in Round 1 was 4.22 and in Round 3 it 
was 4.07.  Therefore, the perceived business value of Continuous Monitoring dropped 
slightly between Rounds 1 and 3.  One possible explanation for this decrease is that as 
participants pondered the complexities of a Continuous Monitoring system within the 
context of a specific business case, the implementation complexities caused their 




The Ryan-Joiner normality had a p-value of 0.01, which implies that this variable 
was not normally distributed at α = 0.05.  As a result, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used to 
determine if this question’s decrease between Round 1 and Round 3 was significant.  The 
resulting p-value was 0.30.  Therefore, this decrease was not significant at an α = 0.10, 
which implies that participating in this study did not significantly affect participant’s 
perceptions of Continuous Monitoring’s business value.  
In Round 2 there was a non-trivial amount of standard deviation, which represents 
disagreement between the respondents about the viability of Continuous Monitoring.  In 
an attempt to drive consensus among participants, Round 2’s assumptions questions (see 
Questions 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21 and 22 in Appendix B) were qualitatively 
analyzed and the most frequently listed assumptions were voted on in Round 3 (see 
Questions 3, 9 and 15 in Appendix C for a complete lists of assumptions).  Every 
question in Round 3 had a lower standard deviation than the corresponding question in 
Round 2.   
Table  6.32 Standard Deviation by Question between Rounds  
Question Case Round 2 Round 3 
Cost Human Judgment Bear Stearns 1.7 1.0 
 RIM 1.7 1.2 
 Sony 1.6 1.0 
Cost Predictive Model Bear Stearns 1.2 1.0 
 RIM 1.5 1.2 
 Sony 1.0 0.8 
Predictive Model Can be Built Bear Stearns 1.7 1.0 
 RIM 1.8 1.2 
 Sony 1.6 1.1 
Model Compared to Human Judgment  Bear Stearns 1.7 1.1 
 RIM 1.7 1.4 





Since a Ryan-Joiner normality test implied that the these questions were generally 
not normally distributed at α = 0.05, a Kruskal-Wallis Test was used to compare Round 1 
and Round 3 results.  Bear Stearns and Sony’s “Cost of Human Judgment” question, RIM 
and Sony’s “Cost of Predictive Model” question, and RIM’s “Predictive Model Can be 
Built” question and “Predictive Model Compared to Human Judgment” question all had 
significant changes between Rounds 2 and 3.  See below table. 








Cost Human Judgment  Bear Stearns* 3 2 0.03 
 RIM 3 2 0.75 
 Sony* 3 2 0.00 
Cost Predictive Model Bear Stearns 2 2 0.31 
 RIM** 2 2 0.02 
 Sony** 2 2 0.07 
Predictive Model Can be Built Bear Stearns 3 3 0.58 
 RIM* 2 3 0.07 
 Sony 3 3 0.36 
Model Compared to Human Judgment  Bear Stearns 3 3 0.11 
 RIM** 2 3 0.02 
 Sony 4 4 0.72 
  * Significant at α = 0.05 
** Significant at α = 0.10 
 
In conclusion the Delphi appears to have driven consensus between participants 
as evidenced by the lower standard deviation between rounds.  However another possible 
explanation for the decrease in standard deviation is that 22 participants dropped out of 
the research experiment between Rounds 1 and 2.  Perhaps, the participants that 




6.4 Limitations  
This research study suffers from the limitations of all self-reported studies.  Specifically, 
respondents may provide answers that they believe the researcher wants to hear, forget 
pertinent details, provide exaggerated or incorrect answers, and/or may not reveal overly 
private information.  Moreover, participants may have various biases, perception 
limitations and/or gaps in their understanding that skew their answers.  In this research 
study many questions’ most frequently selected answer was “I don’t know”, which may 
indicate that several participants had gaps in their understanding of the requisite domain.  
Secondly, there could be a self-selection bias between the respondents, who 
participated in this research study and those who did not.  If there is a systematic 
difference between these groups, it could bias the results.  Similarly, the between round 
dropout rate was high, which could also bias the results between those that completed the 
later rounds and those that did not.  The high dropout rate may have resulted from the 
lengthy and intricate surveys.  This maybe an inherent limitation of the survey research 
method.  Perhaps, a better research approach would have been to use shorter surveys or 
maybe even another research method such as focus groups. 
Thirdly, the response rate for those working at Big 4 accounting firms was 
particularly low, which could have biased the results of Research Question 1.  Research 
Question 1 tested the relationship between working at a Big 4 accounting firm and the 
perceived Business Value of Continuous Monitoring.  Perhaps if more Big 4 accountants 
had participated in this research, this hypothesis would have been supported.  
Finally, this study only evaluated a limited number of scenarios.  In all, only three 




business cases were not representative of the underlying Enterprise Risk, which could 
have skewed the results.  Moreover, there were many Enterprise Risks that were not 
included in this research experiment.  Perhaps including these Enterprise Risks would 








Whether or not Continuous Monitoring could be meaningfully extended to Enterprise 
Risks still remains an open research question.  The obstacles to building such a system 
are formidable.  Replacing human judgment tends to be difficult, costly and 
computationally intensive.  Moreover, large-scale Continuous Monitoring systems may 
be resisted because of their inscrutable complexity and novelty.  However, many believe 
that Continuous Monitoring systems will lead to a more robust and effective 
organizational risk management structure. 
In the future, Continuous Monitoring could be the cornerstone of risk 
management programs.  Initially these systems were designed to remove fraud and other 
similar pathogens from the organization.  Perhaps the absence of fraud and other similar 
dysfunctions is not the pinnacle of a healthy organization and just like organisms, 
organizations may require more than the absence of pathogens to be completely 
“healthy”.   
Perhaps, Continuous Monitoring systems could provide a useful check on human 
decision-making.  Advances in artificial intelligence, big data and Information Systems 
may lead to new classes of decision verification systems that will help improve 
organization decision-making, which could not only increase profitability, but also reduce 
the probability of the next financial crisis.  There is still much more research that is 




7.1  Contributions 
As a direct result of this research study, a new key relationship was identified between 
perceived business value of Continuous Monitoring and the number of years of 
experience in Risk Management and Auditing.  Participants that had more than five years 
of experience in either discipline tended to view Continuous Monitoring more positively 
than participants that had less than five years of experience.  This relationship was 
statistically significant in both Round 1’s exploratory data analysis and the factor analysis 
for the Feasibility and Desirability questions, which were Question 15 and Question 16 
respectively.  
Secondly, this research identifies preferred Enterprise Risks for Continuous 
Monitoring systems.  Participants were more optimistic about Continuous Monitoring 
Systems’ ability to handle computer crime situations than their ability to navigate 
strategic issues such as a company losing its competitive position.  Moreover, this 
research identified three novel uses for Continuous Monitoring: 1) monitoring social 
media to detect potential reputational risks and/or looming public relations crises.  2) 
monitoring the speed of operational and production processes.  3) monitoring medical 
records for potential early warning signs of a serious medical condition. 
Thirdly, this research provides a wealth of qualitative information that could be 
used in other studies.  For example, the specific risk scenarios gathered by this research 
could form the basis of a future Cross Impact Assessment (Bañuls and Turoff 2011). 
Finally, this research provides another illustrative example of the Delphi method driving 




7.2 Future Research 
This research study provides a general approach for understanding whether Continuous 
Monitoring is applicable to an Enterprise Risk.  This research study only covered three of 
the 14 identified Enterprise Risks.  Future research studies can use the same methodology 
to study these other Enterprise Risks as well as any new types of Enterprise Risk that 
arise.  The same methodology could be adapted to study how Continuous Monitoring 
could be adapted to a specific industry’s most pressing Enterprise Risks. 
Moreover this literature review uncovered many broad categories of research 
needed to advance Continuous Monitoring.  The list below is the ten most important 
questions that I believe should be researched. 
1. Workflow:  What heuristics could be used to manage and/or prioritize 
exceptions identified by a Continuous Monitoring system? How should 
Continuous Monitoring workflow be configured? Who should be notified 
when an exception is identified and how often?   
2. Data: Determine what forms of financial, non-financial, competitive, 
marketing and/or qualitative assurance information should be used in a 
Continuous Monitoring system. Identify and analyze potential difficulties 
associated with the evaluation of data and overcoming data gaps.  
3. Data Analysis Algorithms: Can artificial intelligence techniques be used to 
improve Continuous Monitoring strategies? How are the monitoring rules 
stored and applied to the continuous data stream?  
4. Improving Thoroughness and Reliability of decision-making: Empirically 
test the relationship between Continuous Monitoring and Organizational 
decision making.  Does Continuous Monitoring hasten the detection of 
errors and decrease the number of bad decisions made by corporations? 
5. NPV and Break Even point for a Continuous Monitoring system: 
Investigate the extent to which the initial development and deployment 
costs of Continuous Monitoring systems can be offset by ongoing savings.  
6. Behavioral Effects: Investigate whether managers, analysts and/or markets 
will exhibit an adverse or positive reaction to Continuous Monitoring.  





7. Architectural Framework: What is the ideal architecture to integrate 
control frameworks that link together entities, processes, metrics, analytics 
and alarms?  Are there systematic differences in the architecture between 
Continuous Monitoring implementations?  If so what drives them (e.g., 
industry, size, IT characteristics, external auditor, supply partner 
integration, or international presence)? 
8. Security Issues: Examine the extent to which a Continuous Monitoring 
system will create security vulnerabilities.  How can the Continuous 
Monitoring data be secured?  How can data tampering be prevented?  
What are the requisite safeguards to ensure the system is not gamed? 
9. Success Factors: What are the organizational factors that lead an 
organization to adopt Continuous Monitoring technologies?   
10. How to audit the decision-maker: For most risks, human judgment is 
needed. How can Information Technology audit decisions made by 
humans? Many complex business decisions have conflicting criteria and 
require tradeoffs between competing objectives.  Is it even possible to 
automate the monitoring of these decisions? If so, how could the requisite 






APPENDIX A  
ROUND 1 PRE-SURVEY AND SCENARIO GENERATION  
This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Introduction to Robert Baksa's Research Study 
 
ABOUT THIS STUDY: 
This is a study of business managers’ opinions about the potential usefulness of 
Continuous Monitoring to manage Enterprise Risks. Participation in this study typically 
takes less than an hour for each of its three rounds. Participants begin by filling in a 
formal consent form and providing some background information. In the subsequent, two 
rounds a series of targeted questions will be presented. Many individuals find 
participation in this study enjoyable, as well as informative. It will give you the 




A constantly evolving regulatory environment, increasing market pressure to improve 
operations, and rapidly changing business conditions are creating the need for timely and 
ongoing assurance that organizational risks are continually and adequately identified and 
mitigated. Enterprises are perpetually exposed to significant errors, fraud and/or 
inefficiencies that can lead to significant financial loss and increased levels of operating 
risk. Increasingly Information Systems are being harnessed to reinvent the risk 
management process. One promising technology is Continuous Auditing, which seeks to 
transform the audit process from periodic reviews of a few transactions to a continuous 
review of all transactions. However, today’s highly integrated, rapidly changing and 
hypercompetitive business environment spawns numerous risks that have been excluded 
from standard risk management and planning processes. An extension of Continuous 
Auditing is Continuous Monitoring, which is used by management to continually review 
business processes for unexpected deviations. Many believe that Continuous Monitoring 




I am a seasoned Information Systems executive with over two decades of technical, 
financial, implementation, consulting and risk management expertise, as well as a proven 
track record for delivering complex Information Technology systems that produce 
tangible financial results. Some of the more notable projects that I've led include 
reengineering GM’s financial control systems, developing Citi’s award-winning foreign 
exchange trading system, and building Kaplan’s next generation eLearning platform. In 
addition, I authored Chapter 12 of Supporting Real Time Decision-Making: The role of 




Business, a Master of Science in Information Systems from New York University, and a 
Bachelor of Science in Computer Science and Business from the University of 
Pittsburgh. Currently, I am a Ph.D. candidate in Information Systems at New Jersey 
Institute of Technology and employed as a Delivery Practice Head for Lab49, which is a 
design and technology-consulting firm that creates advanced technology solutions for the 
world’s leading investment banks, asset managers and exchanges 
 
WEBBOARD: 
If you would like to interact with your fellow research participants, please go to my 
WebBoard http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/ at any point during this research study. 
After you complete this survey, go to this web board and click the "Register" link. 
However, even without an account, you can browse the posted material and post an 
anonymous message to the group. 
 
REFER A FRIEND:  
The ideal research participant will be over 21 years of age and have at least five years of 
professional experience with operational risk management, Information Systems and/or 
auditing. If you know someone that fits this profile and would be potentially willing. 
Please contact the researcher.  
 
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last). 
 
2. Please enter your preferred email address. 
 
CONSENT 
NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
323 MARTIN LUTHER KING BLVD. 
NEWARK, NJ 07102 
 
TITLE OF STUDY:  
Continuous Monitoring of Enterprise Risks: a Delphi Feasibility Study. 
 
DURATION: 
Maximum estimated duration is 6 months, which assumes two months per round for the 
three scheduled rounds. 
 
RESEARCH STUDY:  
I have been asked to participate in a research study under the direction of Drs. Murray 
Turoff and Starr Roxanne Hiltz.  
 
PROCEDURES:  
During the course of this study, I will participate in on-line Delphi surveys and 
potentially share my thoughts on a message board. 
 
PARTICIPANTS:  






There are two mandatory requirements for this research study: 1) Participants must be 
over the age of 21. 2) Participants must have at least five years of professional experience 
with risk management, Information Systems and/or auditing. I will inform the researcher 
if I do not satisfy the aforementioned requirements.  
 
RISKS/DISCOMFORTS:  
I have been told that the study described above involves no obvious risks and/or 
discomforts. However, there may be risks and discomforts that are not yet known. I fully 
recognize that there may be risks that I may be exposed to by volunteering in this study 
which are inherent in participating in any study; I understand that I am not covered by 
NJIT’s insurance policy for any injury or loss I might sustain in the course of 
participating in the study. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
I understand confidentiality is not the same as anonymous. In this context, confidentiality 
means that my name or affiliation will not be disclosed, without expressed permission. 
Reasonable safeguards will be put in place to protect participant’s confidentiality. The 
raw research data, including the survey responses will be stored on the researcher’s 
password-protected and encrypted computer. Moreover, if the findings from the study are 
published, participants that don't grant consent will not be identified by name in the list of 
participants and their responses, if used, will not be associated with a named individual. 
If there is a documented linkage between their identity and responses, reasonable efforts 
will be made to maintain their confidentiality unless disclosure is required by law. 
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION: 
I have been told that I will receive no compensation for my participation in this study. 
 
RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW: 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may refuse to participate, or may 
discontinue my participation at any time with no adverse consequence. I also understand 
that the investigator has the right to withdraw me from the study at any time. 
 
INDIVIDUAL TO CONTACT: 
If you have any questions about the survey's questions, please browse the FAQ thread of 
the WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/ or contact the researcher directly:  
Robert Baksa 
 
If I have any questions about my treatment or research procedures, I understand that I 




If I have any additional questions about my rights as a research subject, I may contact: 





CONSENT OF PARTICIPANT 
I have read this entire form, and I understand it completely. By "Yes" below, I 
acknowledge that I have read this information and agree to participate in this research, 
with the knowledge that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time without 
penalty. 
 




4. What is your age? 
Less than 21 years old 
21-34 years old 
35-44 years old 
45-54 years old 
55-64 years old 
65-74 years old 
75 years or older 
Prefer not to answer 
 
5. How many years of professional experience do you have in the following areas? Enter 
0 if you have no experience in a particular area. 
Risk Management  
Information Systems  
Internal and/or External Auditing 
 
6. Can we use your name in a list of participants in the research results? (If no, 




7. What is your gender? 
Female 
Male 
Prefer NOT to answer 
 





None of the above 
 















Not Currently Employed 
 





11. How large is your current employer in terms of Total Annual Revenue? 
Under $1M 
> $1 Million and <= $10 Million 
> $10 Million and <= $100 Million 
> $100 Million <= $500 Million 
> $500 Million <= $1 Billion 
Over $1 Billion 
Not sure / Don't know 
 
12. What is your current role in the organization? 
C-Level Executive (i.e., CEO, CTO, CIO etc.) 
Senior Management (i.e., responsible 50+ people, a geographic region, or 
product) 
Supervisor / Middle management (i.e., has less than 50 direct reports) 
Not Employed 
Other 
13. To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to 
provide material business value to today’s companies? 
Very Likely 
Likely 







14. In general how feasible would building a Continuous Monitoring system be for this 










a) Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another 
major financial crisis (e.g., Mortgage default) 
and/or downturn. Recent examples include 
weakness in the Eurozone, projected slowed 
economic growth forecast in India and China, 
persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated 
worldwide unemployment rate, reoccurring 
financial crisis, failure of major countries to pay 
their debt  
      
b) Regulatory pressure and/or changes in 
regulatory environment: Basel III, SOX, Dodd-
Frank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices 
legislation, local privacy, investigation by 
government agency or regulatory body & laws and 
the International Financial Reporting Standards, 
Health Care reforms  
      
c) Surprise Competitive Threats: New and, perhaps 
better, competitors and/or products in the 
marketplace change in consumer trends and 
technological advancements (i.e., product 
obsolesces), increased global competitive 
pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such as 
price wars), mergers and acquisitions.  
      
d) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk        
e) Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls, 
regulatory challenges (e.g., JP Morgan Chase), 
involvement in a corporate or personal scandal 
(e.g., Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or 
product (e.g., Blackberry), unable to meet demand 
for successful product, being flamed on social 
media.  
      
f) Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits       
g) External Business interruption: Infrastructure 
failures (e.g., electricity and telecommunication 
network failures), financial market failures 
(closing of key markets), loss of computer 
infrastructure, transportation strikes, criminal 
attacks, or embargos.  
      
h) Internal Business interruption: For example 
strike or slowdown, accidents, fraud, workplace 
violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear power 
plant explosion of materials or fires).  
      
i) Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas, 
shortages that lead to price run-ups.  
      
j) Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus 
and malicious code, proprietary or customer 
information can be stolen via hacking or internal 
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards); malicious 
software can disrupt operations of essential 
services such as security, defense, power plants, as 
well as banking, commerce, etc. 


















a) Economic Volatility or Slowdown: Another 
major financial crisis (e.g., Mortgage default) 
and/or downturn. Recent examples include 
weakness in the Eurozone, projected slowed 
economic growth forecast in India and China, 
persistent fiscal changes in Japan, and elevated 
worldwide unemployment rate, reoccurring 
financial crisis, failure of major countries to pay 
their debt  
      
b) Regulatory pressure and/or changes in 
regulatory environment: Basel III, SOX, Dodd-
Frank, Solvency II, foreign corrupt practices 
legislation, local privacy, investigation by 
government agency or regulatory body & laws 
and the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, Health Care reforms  
      
c) Surprise Competitive Threats: New and, 
perhaps better, competitors and/or products in 
the marketplace change in consumer trends and 
technological advancements (i.e., product 
obsolesces), increased global competitive 
pressures, aggressive competitive tactics (such 
as price wars), mergers and acquisitions.  
      
d) Credit, Market and Liquidity Risk        
e) Damage to brand/reputation: product recalls, 
regulatory challenges (e.g., JP Morgan Chase), 
involvement in a corporate or personal scandal 
(e.g., Martha Stewart), failure of core strategy or 
product (e.g., Blackberry), unable to meet 
demand for successful product, being flamed on 
social media.  
      
f) Legal Risks: Customer and employee lawsuits
  
      
g) External Business interruption: Infrastructure 
failures (e.g., electricity and telecommunication 
network failures), financial market failures 
(closing of key markets), loss of computer 
infrastructure, transportation strikes, criminal 
attacks, or embargos.  
      
h) Internal Business interruption: For example 
strike or slowdown, accidents, fraud, workplace 
violence, industrial accidents (e.g., nuclear 
power plant explosion of materials or fires).  
      
i) Commodity Price Risk: Crude oil, Natural gas, 
shortages that lead to price run-ups.  
      
j) Computer Crime: Financial losses from virus 
and malicious code, proprietary or customer 
information can be stolen via hacking or internal 
theft (e.g., target customer credit cards); 
malicious software can disrupt operations of 
essential services such as security, defense, 
power plants, as well as banking, commerce, etc.
  
      
 
16. Describe a specific risk scenario that you feel would be the most auspicious area for a 
Continuous Monitoring system. Ideally this risk scenario would NOT already be 
adequately mitigated by the operating controls currently in place and would be achievable 
with existing technology. Please briefly suggest leading indicators, potential 




APPENDIX B  
ROUND 2: DELPHI 
This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Summary of Round 2 Results: 
In Round 1, there were 188 fully completed responses, 29 of which were from C-Level 
executives (e.g., CEOs, CTOs CIOs, etc.). Respondents had an average of 13 years of I.T. 
experience, and six years of risk management and internal/external audit experience. 122 
respondents (65% of the total) identified themselves as male and only 11 (6% of the total) 
have worked at a Big 4 accounting firm. 
 
The respondents worked in a multitude of different industries. In fact, 60% selected 
“Other” for their industry and of the ten industries listed on the survey; each had three or 
more respondents. The respondents tended to work in larger companies. “Over a billion”, 
which was the largest revenue category on the survey, and was also the most frequently 
selected, with 50 respondents (27% of the total). The other 5 revenue levels all had at 
least ten respondents each. 
 
Overall, the respondents had a very positive view of Continuous Monitoring. 73 
respondents (39% of the total) believed Continuous Monitoring is “Very Likely” to have 
material business value, while 83 respondents (44% of the total) believe Continuous 
Monitoring is “Likely” to have material business value. In terms of feasibility and 
desirability, the top three Enterprise Risks that the participants felt lend themselves to a 
Continuous Monitoring system are: (1) Computer Crime (2) Credit, Market and Liquidity 
Risk (3) Damage to Brand and Reputation. More respondents (33 or 17.5% of the total) 
suggested a specific computer crime scenario (e.g., hacking, IP theft, etc.) as the most 
auspicious area for a Continuous Monitoring system. Figure 1 below has the detailed 
breakdown of the results.  
 
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last) 
2. Please enter your preferred email address? 
Directions for Round 2 
This round will focus on the top three Enterprise Risks identified in the prior round. 
Please read carefully the following excerpts from three Harvard Business School Cases 
that describe a specific example of a type of Enterprise Risk and answer the questions 
that follow. By design, these cases describe real events that were heavily covered by the 




If you have questions about this round or would like to interact more with your fellow 
research participants, please go to my WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/. 
Alternatively, you can email your questions directly to me at rbb25@njit.edu 
 
Sony PlayStation: Security Breach  
by (Seijts and Bigus 2012) HBS: W12309  
 
Launched by Sony in 2010, Qriocity provided a cloud-based digital video and music 
service to consumers. Operated as a subscription service, Qriocity users set up an online 
account and paid a fee to access content. For Sony, Qriocity represented an opportunity to 
better integrate the company’s consumer electronics with online music, movies and 
games. In 2011, Sony had over 350 million Internet-connected devices in use around the 
world, providing the company with a significant market of potential Qriocity customers.  
 
Sometime between Sunday, April 17 and Tuesday, April 19, 2011, Sony’s PlayStation 
and Qriocity user account information had been compromised as the result of an illegal 
intrusion into the company network. In response to this security threat, on Wednesday, 
April 20, 2011, Sony suspended all PlayStation and Qriocity networks services for 24 
days, while Sony retained an external security firm to conduct a complete investigation of 
the incident. On May 4, Sony confirmed that personal information including names, 
birthdates, physical and e-mail addresses, network IDs and passwords, and possibly credit 
card information was stolen from its 77 million customers, which makes it one of the 
largest data security breaches in history. On May 23, Sony stated that this outage cost 
$171 million.  
 
Sony had several security incidences before the attack. First, a month before the attack, 
the PlayStation.com website was a hacked by a group called Anonymous, apparently in 
response to Sony taking legal action against two modders, who are hackers that modify 
their consoles to give them additional functionality. Second, PlayStation 3 modders were 
claiming that PSN Web servers were running outdated versions of Apache and Linux, 
which had well known vulnerabilities. Finally, two weeks before the intrusion, Sony's 
networks were probed by a program that checks for known security vulnerabilities. Some 
speculate that if Sony had used an intrusion detection system prior to the attack, they may 
have noticed these vulnerabilities, which may have prompted them to heighten their 
defenses to guard against an attack.  
 
Sony submitted written answers to questions posed by the United States House 
Subcommittee about this cyber-attack. Sony stated that they were the victim of a very 
carefully planned, professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber-attack. The forensic 
teams were able to confirm the scope of the personal data they believed had been taken, 
and could not rule out that credit card information was also taken. They were taking a 
number of steps to prevent future breaches. 
 




3. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained 
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of 
access). 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form 
Some of the relevant data is available digitally 
About half of the relevant data is available digitally 
Most of the relevant data is available digitally 
All the relevant data is available digitally 
 
4. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 







Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a 
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating 
the data into the model.  
 
5. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional 
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk? 







6. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 





7. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building 
this real-time predictive model.  
 
8. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional 
consultants) for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human 
judgments.  
 
9. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring 
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe 
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion. 
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)  
Dashboard Reporting 
Data Warehouse 
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)  
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by 
a systematic process)  
Other (please specify)  
 
Bear Stearns  
by (Rose, Bergstresser et al. 2009 ) 
 
Founded in 1923, Bear Stearns & Co. (Bear) was the fifth largest U.S. investment bank in 
early 2008. However, it burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves 
during the week of March 10, 2008. Bear’s economic engine was its fixed income 
business. In 2006, Bear’s fixed income business contributed $3.62 billion in revenues, 
compared to $1.33 billion from investment banking and $1.38 billion from equities. 
Mortgages and mortgage-backed securities comprised most of the fixed income business, 
representing about 31% of the securities it owned. Bear was among the largest players in 
the mortgage market, and was the leading underwriter of U.S. mortgage backed securities 





New financial market stresses, largely rooted in the U.S. housing market, emerged in 
2007 and intensified in early 2008. Because home mortgages and home equity loans were 
frequently packaged and sold in securities that were in turn sold to a wide variety of 
investors, the rapid deterioration of housing prices was widely felt and created a 
heightened sense of anxiety across the financial markets. U.S. housing prices had 
appreciated rapidly between 1998 and 2006. This occurred alongside easier access to 
mortgage finance, especially among less credit-worthy borrowers. The origination of 
subprime mortgage loans grew from $190 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005. 
 
Even during auspicious periods, mortgage backed securities were often illiquid. As 
default rates rose and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated, the absence of a liquid 
trading market forced investors to seek bids from the commercial and investment banks 
that initially created and sold them. Wary of repurchasing too much of these securities, 
banks began to reduce the price they would pay and quantity they would buy for these 
securities. This only increased the downward pressure on bond prices, creating a “vicious 
circle” among the holders of mortgage backed securities: in addition to the uncertainty in 
fundamental value created by rising default rates, the reduction in prices by the bond 
dealers created even greater urgency on the part of investors to sell these securities, 
which forced the dealers to mark prices down even further. This vicious circle caused 
dealers, such as Bear, to accumulate larger and larger inventories of these securities, 
which were valued at perpetually lower prices. 
 
Two large hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns had invested heavily in illiquid 
Collateralized Debt Obligations tied to mortgage backed securities. These funds had 
magnified their exposure to mortgage markets through the use of leverage; the fund 
managers were able to purchase as much as $60 worth of Collateralized Debt Obligations 
for each dollar invested. When these funds began selling assets to meet investor demands, 
it quickly led to the implosion of Bear. Bear survived to the close of business on Friday, 
March 14 only because of that morning’s groundbreaking announcement: the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed), using JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC) as a 
conduit, would provide Bear with secured financing for a period of up to 28 days. Despite 
this unprecedented provision of liquidity support, it was insufficient to reverse the decline 
in Bear’s condition. On March 16, Bear’s board accepted JPMC’s offer to purchase Bear 
for $2 per share, which was subsequently increased to $10 a share. 
 





10. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained 
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of 
access). 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form 
Some of the relevant data is available digitally 
About half of the relevant data is available digitally 
Most of the relevant data is available digitally 
All the relevant data is available digitally 
 
11. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 







Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a 
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating 
the data into the model.  
 
12. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional 
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk? 







13. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 





14. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building 
this real-time predictive model.  
 
15. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or 
professional consultants) for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human 
judgments.  
 
16. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring 
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe 
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion. 
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)  
Dashboard Reporting 
Data Warehouse 
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)  
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by 
a systematic process)  
Other (please specify)  
 
RIM  
by (Burr, Rothaermel et al. 2014) 
 
In 1999, RIM introduced the BlackBerry 850 pager, which could receive push email from 
a Microsoft Exchange Server. In April 2000, the first BlackBerry smartphone, 
BlackBerry 957, was released. It included e-mail, paging and organizer features, as well 
as a 32-bit Intel 386 processor, 5MB flash memory, a QWERTY keyboard and an 
embedded wireless modem. 
 
RIM experienced explosive growth in the early 2000s. Revenues were $85 million in 
2000, which by 2007 increased to $3.04 billion and still showed signs of strong growth. 




cultivated a cult following among customers. The term “CrackBerry” was coined to 
characterize Blackberry’s addictive nature. In 2007, RIM had a subscriber base of eight 
million. 
 
However, Apple’s January 2007 introduction of the iPhone, which was dubbed the 
“Blackberry Killer”, marked the start of RIM’s decline. Competition increased again on 
October 22, 2008 when the first commercially available smartphone running Android was 
released. In 2009, RIM’s BlackBerry smartphone held a 20% share of the global market. 
However, by 2013, RIM’s global market share dropped to 1.9% while smartphones using 
Android and Apple respectively held 78.6% and 20% of the global smartphone market. In 
the third quarter of 2013, Windows Phones surpassed Blackberry as the third leading 
operating system for smartphones. 
 
After 2007, analysts, investors and the media became increasingly concerned about 
RIM’s ability to compete. At the time, RIM’s hardware and operating system were 
criticized for being outdated and unappealing compared to their competition. Moreover, 
the Blackberry’s browsing capabilities were generally considered to be woefully 
inadequate compared to its competitors. 
 
In September 2010, RIM announced the long rumored BlackBerry PlayBook tablet, 
officially released in April 2011. The PlayBook was criticized for being rushed to market 
in an incomplete state and sold poorly. Slow sales led to inventory pileups, which 
ultimately resulted in price cuts and a $485 million inventory write down. 
 
In March 2011, RIM indicated that they planned to "launch some powerful new 
BlackBerrys." On January 2013, after much criticism and numerous delays, RIM 
officially launched two new smartphones, the BlackBerry Z10 and Q10, which thus far 
have sold poorly. In 2011, RIM felt that they owned the keyboard phone market and 
could afford to wait. However, the early promotion of these supposedly game changing 
devices may have hurt sales of BlackBerry’s existing products, which were already 
steadily losing market share. 
 
In September 2011, which coincided with the launch of iPhone 4S, the RIM’s Internet 
Service suffered a massive outage, impacting millions of customers for several days. On 
August 12, 2013, Blackberry announced that it was open to being purchased, which is 
one of the reasons that it has been placed on the list of "10 Brands That Will Disappear in 
2015." 
 






17. Can the data required to understand the current degree of this type of risk be obtained 
from current digital sources (e.g., databases or online sources, etc.)? (Ignore costs of 
access). 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
None or very little of the data needed is in a digital form 
Some of the relevant data is available digitally 
About half of the relevant data is available digitally 
Most of the relevant data is available digitally 
All the relevant data is available digitally 
 
18. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 







Please list at least one assumption that you made about the use of data sources in a 
predictive model including any specific data related challenges related to integrating 
the data into the model.  
 
19. Would reliance on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional 
consultants) be able to adequately detect changes in the degree of this risk? 







20. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 





21. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about the cost of building 
this real-time predictive model.  
 
22. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or 
professional consultants) for this risk would be: 







Please list at least one relevant assumption that you made about reliance on human 
judgments.  
 
23. Select all the components that would likely be contained in a Continuous Monitoring 
system for this type of risk (check all that apply). Leave this question blank if you believe 
none of the below are required or you don't have an opinion. 
Analytical Functions (e.g., Regression Models, Expert Systems, Neural Nets, etc.)  
Dashboard Reporting 
Data Warehouse 
Digital Agents (e.g., software that autonomously performs services or collects data)  
Workflows (i.e., orchestrated and repeatable pattern of business activity supported by 





APPENDIX C  
ROUND 3 DELPHI AND POST-SURVEY QUESTIONS 
This survey was implemented on Survey Monkey:  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Directions for Round 3 
Round 3, which is the final round, will focus on confirming or refuting the most popular 
assumptions made in Round 2, and give you a chance to revise your answers in light of 
these assumptions. The same Harvard Business School Cases will be used as a basis for 
Round 3. However, all the questions that didn't collect assumptions have been dropped. 
This round concludes with a few questions to assess the perceived quality of this research 
study. 
 
If you have questions about this round or would like to interact more with your fellow 
research participants, please go to my WebBoard: http://baksaphd.activeboard.com/. 
Alternatively, you can email your questions directly to me at rbb25@njit.edu 
You will be sent a concise summary of this Round's results within 60 days of the 
completion of this round. I will also notify you when my thesis has been completed. In 
case you would like to receive a copy. 
 
1. Please Enter Your Full Name (i.e., First and Last) 
2. Please enter your preferred email address? 
Summary of Round 2 Results 
Round 2 presented three Enterprise Risks: 1) Sony that dealt with cyber security; 2) Bear 
Stearns that dealt with operational risk; 3) RIM that dealt with Strategic Risk. The 188 
respondents that completed Round 1 were sent the Round 2 survey. Round 2 had 81 
respondents that completed the entire survey. The between round dropout rate was 57%. 
 
Roughly half of the participants stated that each component (e.g., analytically 
components, dashboard reporting, data warehouses, and digital agents) were required on 
all three cases. No new architecture components where identified. 
 
The Likert questions were constructed such that a higher Likert score indicated a more 
advantageous scenario for Continuous Monitoring. In aggregate, the results of Round 2 
mirrored Round 1. Respondents in Round 2 ranked Sony as the most advantageous 
Continuous Monitoring case with a mean Likert score of 3.24 out of 5, which was 
followed by Bearn Stearns with a mean Likert score of 3.06 out of 5, while once again 
RIM was viewed the least advantageous case with a mean Likert score of 2.95 out of 5. 




score and its standard deviation. Blackberry had the highest aggregate standard deviation 
(1.15), followed by Bear Stearns (1.11), and then Sony (1.02).  The high standard 
deviations represent disagreement between the respondents about the viability of 
Continuous Monitoring. The disagreement could result from the vastly different 
assumptions respondents made about the cases. Round 3 will explore the veracity of these 
assumptions. 
 
Sony PlayStation: Security Breach  
by (Seijts and Bigus 2012) HBS: W12309  
 
Launched by Sony in 2010, Qriocity provided a cloud-based digital video and music 
service to consumers. Operated as a subscription service, Qriocity users set up an online 
account and paid a fee to access content. For Sony, Qriocity represented an opportunity to 
better integrate the company’s consumer electronics with online music, movies and 
games. In 2011, Sony had over 350 million Internet-connected devices in use around the 
world, providing the company with a significant market of potential Qriocity customers.  
 
Sometime between Sunday, April 17 and Tuesday, April 19, 2011, Sony’s PlayStation 
and Qriocity user account information had been compromised as the result of an illegal 
intrusion into the company network. In response to this security threat, on Wednesday, 
April 20, 2011, Sony suspended all PlayStation and Qriocity networks services for 24 
days, while Sony retained an external security firm to conduct a complete investigation of 
the incident. On May 4, Sony confirmed that personal information including names, 
birthdates, physical and e-mail addresses, network IDs and passwords, and possibly credit 
card information was stolen from its 77 million customers, which makes it one of the 
largest data security breaches in history. On May 23, Sony stated that this outage cost 
$171 million.  
 
Sony had several security incidences before the attack. First, a month before the attack, 
the PlayStation.com website was a hacked by a group called Anonymous, apparently in 
response to Sony taking legal action against two modders, who are hackers that modify 
their consoles to give them additional functionality. Second, PlayStation 3 modders were 
claiming that PSN Web servers were running outdated versions of Apache and Linux, 
which had well known vulnerabilities. Finally, two weeks before the intrusion, Sony's 
networks were probed by a program that checks for known security vulnerabilities. Some 
speculate that if Sony had used an intrusion detection system prior to the attack, they may 
have noticed these vulnerabilities, which may have prompted them to heighten their 
defenses to guard against an attack.  
 
Sony submitted written answers to questions posed by the United States House 
Subcommittee about this cyber-attack. Sony stated that they were the victim of a very 
carefully planned, professional, highly sophisticated criminal cyber-attack. The forensic 
teams were able to confirm the scope of the personal data they believed had been taken, 
and could not rule out that credit card information was also taken. They were taking a 




For this type of cyber-attack risk scenario, please answer the following questions: 
3. Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the Sony case. Please 














3.1) Standard data access patterns and exceptions to 
them can be readily defined and identified 
     
3.2) There exists publicly available data on past 
security breaches from other companies as well as 
known software and hardware security 
vulnerabilities 
     
3.3) All key infrastructure components are running 
operating systems and software that can be scanned 
using industry standard vulnerability detection 
software.  This information can be easily accessed, 
aggregated and monitored. 
     
3.4) Cyber-attacks can happen very quickly. In 
milliseconds, large volumes of highly sensitive data 
can be stolen.  As such, humans aren't well equipped 
to stop an in-flight cyber attack 
     
3.5) The number of possible security threats a large 
corporation such as Sony faces is nearly infinite and 
new threats appear all the time.  As such, it would be 
very difficult for even a large team of security 
experts to manually review and process all the 
requisite information and data. 
     
3.6) Human and automated systems each have their 
own complementary strengths.  An automated 
system is superior at real-time response or for 
implementing action as soon as a risk is detected. 
However, human judgment is superior at foreseeing 
possible threats/risks and initiating a course of 
action to mitigate these risks before they materialize. 
     
3.7) The large cost of building this security model 
could be spread across a large group of constituents, 
which would make the cost "reasonable" for each 
individual member. 
     
3.8) Sony's security needs can be adequately met by 
3rd party package (e.g., Fireeye) with minimal 
customizations. 
     
3.9) The "cost" of relying on human judgment 
includes not just the cost to hire the personnel, but 
also the costs stem from a security breach 
     
3.10) Very experienced security experts have very 
high salaries 
     
 
Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new 
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please 
include its reference (e.g., 3.1, 3.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box blank 
if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions 
 
QUESTIONS 4 TO 8 BELOW REFER TO THE SONY CASE: 
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please re-answer the below 





4. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 








5. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 
6. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 








7. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or professional 
consultants) for this risk would be: 








8. For this case, "Digital Agents" was the most frequently selected component in Round. 
Please briefly describe how it could be used in this Continuous Monitoring System 
 
Bear Stearns  
by (Rose, Bergstresser et al. 2009 ) 
 
Founded in 1923, Bear Stearns & Co. (Bear) was the fifth largest U.S. investment bank in 
early 2008. However, it burned through nearly all of its $18 billion in cash reserves 




business. In 2006, Bear’s fixed income business contributed $3.62 billion in revenues, 
compared to $1.33 billion from investment banking and $1.38 billion from equities. 
Mortgages and mortgage-backed securities comprised most of the fixed income business, 
representing about 31% of the securities it owned. Bear was among the largest players in 
the mortgage market, and was the leading underwriter of U.S. mortgage backed securities 
from 2004 to 2007. 
 
New financial market stresses, largely rooted in the U.S. housing market, emerged in 
2007 and intensified in early 2008. Because home mortgages and home equity loans were 
frequently packaged and sold in securities that were in turn sold to a wide variety of 
investors, the rapid deterioration of housing prices was widely felt and created a 
heightened sense of anxiety across the financial markets. U.S. housing prices had 
appreciated rapidly between 1998 and 2006. This occurred alongside easier access to 
mortgage finance, especially among less credit-worthy borrowers. The origination of 
subprime mortgage loans grew from $190 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in 2005. 
 
Even during auspicious periods, mortgage backed securities were often illiquid. As 
default rates rose and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated, the absence of a liquid 
trading market forced investors to seek bids from the commercial and investment banks 
that initially created and sold them. Wary of repurchasing too much of these securities, 
banks began to reduce the price they would pay and quantity they would buy for these 
securities. This only increased the downward pressure on bond prices, creating a “vicious 
circle” among the holders of mortgage backed securities: in addition to the uncertainty in 
fundamental value created by rising default rates, the reduction in prices by the bond 
dealers created even greater urgency on the part of investors to sell these securities, 
which forced the dealers to mark prices down even further. This vicious circle caused 
dealers, such as Bear, to accumulate larger and larger inventories of these securities, 
which were valued at perpetually lower prices. 
 
Two large hedge funds managed by Bear Stearns had invested heavily in illiquid 
Collateralized Debt Obligations tied to mortgage backed securities. These funds had 
magnified their exposure to mortgage markets through the use of leverage; the fund 
managers were able to purchase as much as $60 worth of Collateralized Debt Obligations 
for each dollar invested. When these funds began selling assets to meet investor demands, 
it quickly led to the implosion of Bear. Bear survived to the close of business on Friday, 
March 14 only because of that morning’s groundbreaking announcement: the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (N.Y. Fed), using JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC) as a 
conduit, would provide Bear with secured financing for a period of up to 28 days. Despite 
this unprecedented provision of liquidity support, it was insufficient to reverse the decline 
in Bear’s condition. On March 16, Bear’s board accepted JPMC’s offer to purchase Bear 
for $2 per share, which was subsequently increased to $10 a share. 
 
For this type of liquidity risk scenario, please answer the following questions: 
 
Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the Bear Stearns case. 

















9.1) Time-series models of held inventory could 
provide a directional indication on where the market is 
heading. 
     
9.2) In general, modeling would have a difficult time 
predicting "black swan" events like this one because by 
definition there is very little (if any)  historic data on 
this risk scenario 
     
9.3) While there is data that can indicate the absence of 
liquidity, by the time it is observed, it is likely to be too 
late to act on it. 
     
9.4) Experienced traders could predict this black swan 
event by generalizing from similar events that occurred 
in other markets. 
     
9.5) Markets are largely efficient and unpredictable.  
Even if the absence of liquidity could have been 
detected by a model, by the time it’s detected it would 
likely be too late to do anything about it. 
     
9.6) If a sufficient number of data points could be 
aggregated from all market participants, adequate 
models could be constructed. 
     
9.7) In these high stake situations, a predictive model 
would be more impartial than human judgment, which 
could become clouded by greed and self interest 
     
9.8) Illiquid products are difficult to value, and hence, 
modeling them would be very difficult and costly. 
     
9.9) Ultimately, like all securities, the price of a MBS 
product depends on what the market will pay for it and 
that is not predictable in the short term 
     
9.10) These products are only understood by a handful 
of highly compensated traders and market participants.  
Consequently the costs to build these models would be 
very high. 
     
 
Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new 
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please 
include its reference (e.g., 9.1, 9.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box blank 
if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions 
 
QUESTIONS 10 TO 14 BELOW REFER TO THE SONY CASE: 
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please re-answer the below 
questions about this case 
 
10. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 











11. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 
12. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 







13. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or 
professional consultants) for this risk would be: 








14. For this case, "Data Warehouse” was the most frequently selected component in 
Round.  Please briefly describe how it could be used in this Continuous Monitoring 
System 
 
RIM   
by (Burr, Rothaermel et al. 2014) 
 
In 1999, RIM introduced the BlackBerry 850 pager, which could receive push email from 
a Microsoft Exchange Server. In April 2000, the first BlackBerry smartphone, 
BlackBerry 957, was released. It included e-mail, paging and organizer features, as well 
as a 32-bit Intel 386 processor, 5MB flash memory, a QWERTY keyboard and an 
embedded wireless modem. 
 
RIM experienced explosive growth in the early 2000s. Revenues were $85 million in 
2000, which by 2007 increased to $3.04 billion and still showed signs of strong growth. 
During this period, gross margins had risen from 43% to 54.6%. In addition, RIM had 
cultivated a cult following among customers. The term “CrackBerry” was coined to 






However, Apple’s January 2007 introduction of the iPhone, which was dubbed the 
“Blackberry Killer”, marked the start of RIM’s decline. Competition increased again on 
October 22, 2008 when the first commercially available smartphone running Android was 
released. In 2009, RIM’s BlackBerry smartphone held a 20% share of the global market. 
However, by 2013, RIM’s global market share dropped to 1.9% while smartphones using 
Android and Apple respectively held 78.6% and 20% of the global smartphone market. In 
the third quarter of 2013, Windows Phones surpassed Blackberry as the third leading 
operating system for smartphones. 
 
After 2007, analysts, investors and the media became increasingly concerned about 
RIM’s ability to compete. At the time, RIM’s hardware and operating system were 
criticized for being outdated and unappealing compared to their competition. Moreover, 
the Blackberry’s browsing capabilities were generally considered to be woefully 
inadequate compared to its competitors. 
 
In September 2010, RIM announced the long rumored BlackBerry PlayBook tablet, 
officially released in April 2011. The PlayBook was criticized for being rushed to market 
in an incomplete state and sold poorly. Slow sales led to inventory pileups, which 
ultimately resulted in price cuts and a $485 million inventory write down. 
 
In March 2011, RIM indicated that they planned to "launch some powerful new 
BlackBerrys." On January 2013, after much criticism and numerous delays, RIM 
officially launched two new smartphones, the BlackBerry Z10 and Q10, which thus far 
have sold poorly. In 2011, RIM felt that they owned the keyboard phone market and 
could afford to wait. However, the early promotion of these supposedly game changing 
devices may have hurt sales of BlackBerry’s existing products, which were already 
steadily losing market share. 
 
In September 2011, which coincided with the launch of iPhone 4S, the RIM’s Internet 
Service suffered a massive outage, impacting millions of customers for several days. On 
August 12, 2013, Blackberry announced that it was open to being purchased, which is 
one of the reasons that it has been placed on the list of "10 Brands That Will Disappear in 
2015." 
 






15. Below are the ten most frequently mentioned assumptions for the RIM case. Please 














15.1) Innovation is still strictly a human endeavor, 
modeling it would be a limited value 
     
15.2) Basic market research, customer polls, and 
declining sales trend could have provided a strong 
leading indicator to the downfall RIM's dominance. 
     
15.3) Detecting RIM's declining sales could be done 
adequately well by either a human or a predictive 
algorithm.  However, only a human could formulate and 
implement a strategic vision to reverse this trend 
     
15.4) A predictive model could pull information from 
the web by scanning Facebook postings, twitter feeds, 
etc. to predict RIM's looming decline 
     
15.5) This predictive model doesn't need to be real time.  
It could safely be run monthly quarterly, or even yearly 
     
15.6) Experts have a very tough time predicting which 
products will be "hot" and which products will fall out 
of favor 
     
15.7) Highly creative people are expensive      
15.8) In RIM's situation, human judgment was blinded 
by over confidence 
     
15.9) The market forces that led to RIM's decline were 
so unique that building a predictive model for them 
would be prohibitively expensive and, probably not 
very reusable 
     
15.10) Apple and Android's ultimate success in the 
market place couldn't be predicted by any means 
     
 
Use the below text box to either clarify the above assumptions or list entirely new 
assumption(s) about this case. If you are commenting on an above assumption, please 
include its reference (e.g., 15.1, 15.2 …) in your response. Leave the below text box 
blank if the above accurately summaries your key assumptions 
 
QUESTIONS 16 TO 20 BELOW REFER TO THE RIM CASE: 
In light of the above assumptions that you feel are valid, please re-answer the below 
questions about this case 
 
16. Can a real time predictive model be constructed with a reasonable effort and 
investment within a one-year time horizon by an appropriate development group? 










17. Relative to conventional human judgment, a real-time predictive model would be 
No Judgment / I don’t know 
Far inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Moderately inferior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions   
About the same 
Moderately superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
Far superior in terms of accuracy, consistency and/or timeliness of predictions 
 
18. The cost of building a real-time predictive model for this risk would be: 







19. The costs of relying on human judgments (i.e., either internal expertise or 
professional consultants) for this risk would be: 







20. For this case, "Analytical Functions" was the most frequently selected component in 
Round 2. Please briefly describe how they could be used in this Continuous Monitoring 
System.  
 
Post Survey Questions 
21. Did you obtain useful information from this study?  
None 
Not much 
A few pieces of useful information 
Some useful information  
Lots of useful information 
 
22. What is the potential importance of this study's results? 
Irrelevant 








23. To what extent do you believe that Continuous Monitoring has the potential to 
provide material business value to today’s companies?  
Very Likely  
Likely 
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